Burma Monitor

New book praises Suu Kyi’s nonviolence

2012-01-26T10:35:00.000-08:00

Thursday, 26 January 2012 11:58 Mizzima News

(Mizzima) – A new book “Evolving the Spirit – From Democracy to Peace” by Anthony Russell praises Aung San Suu Kyi as one of the leaders who uses a religious spirit in her efforts to establish democracy and peace in Burma.

Author Anthony Russell Photo: thechandos.com

Author Russell writes: “What fascinates me is the single belief-system that runs through all the great religions. Cut away the political fat and they all throb with a single spiritual beat.”

The book, launched by Burma Campaign UK on Wednesday, describes 10 steps to help reach peace, the understanding that once we change personally, none around us can remain unaffected. “This change can then ripple out to affect the world beyond,” said Russell.

“Taking the principle of non-violence to the wider world is even today political dynamite,” he writes. “Aung San Suu Kyi represents that spirit to perfection. There is nothing naive about her. She is sophisticated, knowledgeable and deeply grounded in her morality and common sense. She has every chance of leading Burma out of the morass in which it finds itself.”

However, the book carries a warning, made clear by Gandhi’s writings as well as his sudden demise, that nonviolence is not the passive, easy approach traditionally portrayed. To Russell, “It is as controversial and threatening today as in Roman times though just as relevant.”

The book includes contributions from the BBC’s World Affairs Editor John Simpson, the conservationist Chris Darwin, and UK Foreign Secretary William Hague.

Russell has been involved with the Burma Campaign UK promoting awareness of human rights. A staunch advocate of nonviolence and an anti-war campaigner, he is a disciple of Mahatma Gandhi and has said he would like the West as to promote democratic principles more strongly. He believes that only strengthened international law, in the form of the UN, ICC and the IMF, can bring lasting peace.

All the great faiths of the world, he argues, share a “golden threat” of truth, which is all that really matters, as the rest is “mere politics.”

In “Evolving the Spirit',” he argues that peace in the world comes from international cooperation on one level but just as importantly, from each of us as individuals. Each person’s ultimate power is achieved by assuming the “dignity of the mature,” he has said, “acting not reacting,” having no enemies and not judging others or taking revenge.

Burma Must End Discrimination: ENC

2011-11-02T14:08:00.000-07:00

Source - http://www.encburma.net/index.php/enc-archive/69-enc-archive/781-burma-must-end-discrimination-enc-.html

By Chinland Guardian

Wednesday, 02 November 2011 20:06

02 November 2011: The exile-based Ethnic Nationalities Council (ENC) today calls for Burma

to end the practice of systematic discrimination against the ethnic groups.

A new report entitled Discrimination, Conflict and Corruption: The Ethnic States of Burma says

government corruption and widespread discrimination against ethnic peoples continue to fuel armed conflicts in the ethnic areas.

EWC - BEYOND ARMED RESISTANCE: ETHNONATIONAL POLITICS IN BURMA (MYANMAR)

2011-10-29T09:47:00.000-07:00

Source - http://www.eastwestcenter.org/publications/beyond-armed-resistance-ethnonational-politics-burma-myanmar

BEYOND ARMED RESISTANCE: ETHNONATIONAL POLITICS IN BURMA (MYANMAR)

by
Ardeth Maung Thawnghmung

Policy Studies, No. 62

Publisher:

Honolulu: East-West Center

Publication Date: 2011

ISBN: 978-1-932728-98-9

Binding: paper

Pages: xii, 67

Free Download: PDF

Price: $10.00

Bangkok Post - Jade or jaded? The sanctions on Burmese gems

2011-10-26T14:41:00.000-07:00

27/10/2011 at 12:00 AM

For centuries Burma has been prized for its high quality gemstones, and today the Burmese gems industry continues to thrive at a furious pace despite international sanctions.

A Burmese worker washes blocks of jade stone, readying them for auction. The majority of Burma’s jade goes to China.

Conventional estimates are that up to 90% of the world's supply in rubies and 70% of premium jadeite is of Burmese origin.

Long under the exclusive management of ethnic insurgents who controlled the mining areas, and black marketeers who monopolised the trade, the underworld of Burmese gems is now dominated by a myriad of newcomers. Fragile cease-fire agreements signed by Burma's central government with ethnic Kachin, Pa'O and Shan rebels in the 1990s have opened the gem mines and trade routes to other third parties.

Since then, emerging state-run conglomerates, a handful of Burmese oligarchs close to the military elite, and hordes of foreign dealers have gained the upper hand in this thriving industry. Above all, trade has been boosted by an exuberant demand from jade-crazed China.

Every year since 2007 new record levels in jade production and sales revenues have been reached to satisfy Chinese demand. Paradoxically, this Burmese gem boom has coincided with the imposition of "smarter" Western sanctions which have targetted Burma's lucrative mining, timber and gemstones sectors in reaction to the government's violent repression of the 2007 Saffron Revolution.

During the latest 2010-11 fiscal year, Burmese jade export revenues officially topped US$1.75 billion _ a fifth of Burma's $8.86 billion total exports for that year. Production of jadeite has jumped to 46,000 tonnes, up from an average of 10,000 tonnes in the early 2000s. Organised by the state-run Myanmar Gem Enterprises (MGE), international gem emporiums are now held three times a year, mostly in the new capital Naypyidaw. The March 2011 emporium attracted over 6,500 foreign merchants and total monetary transactions reached a staggering $2.8 billion. The Burmese government granted attendees free wi-fi access and phone cards were available for $50 _ unthinkable offers at other normal times in Burma.

Proceeds from gem sales during the latest special fair held in July 2011 exceeded $1.5 billion. In comparison, revenues from similar events during the 2000s stagnated between only $150-300 million.

As a result of the rising source of revenue that these gemstone bonanzas are providing to the Burmese military-ruled state, international campaigns advocating a boycott of Burmese gemstones have become increasingly vocal. Western policy-makers have subsequently relied upon "targetted" sanctions against the industry.

The European Union revised its legal Common Position vis-a-vis Burma in November 2007 to include a section on Burmese-origin gemstones, while in July 2008 the US Congress adopted the Tom Lantos Block Burmese JADE (Junta's Anti-Democratic Effort) Act, which was later signed into law by President George W Bush. In addition, Canada with the 2007 Special Economic Measures Act also prohibits all Burmese imports, including gems.

Yet, if there is a straightforward rationale for Western sanctions, scepticism prevails regarding their on-the-ground policy relevance and impact on the circulation of Burmese gems. Indeed, since the implementation of these various laws, Burma's revenues from gemstones have continued to skyrocket.

The root of this problem is due to a serious miscalculation by these Western governments. In recent years, China has become the dominant market for the global jade industry. Also, Burma's border trade, especially with China's southwestern Yunnan province, offers a credible alternative to circumvent Western trade sanctions. Consider the border town of Ruili in Yunnan province. In less than a decade, it has become one of Asia's major jade dealing centres, connected to international hubs such as Hong Kong, Taipei and Bangkok. In 2010, gem trading alone earned the town some 2 billion yuan ($300 million). A jade-oriented touristic economy is thriving. Young Chinese from Kunming and beyond are migrating to Ruili to work in shops or factories polishing Burmese raw stones into fashionable jewels.

In Burma, it is estimated that there are nearly half a million people employed in this bustling industry.

As with many other Burmese commodities, the dilemma of Western sanctions lies in the tension between the will to drain revenues out of the Burmese rulers' pockets without killing local indigenous entrepreneurship. Smarter sanctions were designed to address this dilemma. America's Burmese JADE Act was intended to emulate Africa's "blood diamonds" model. In 2003, the Kimberley Process was initiated to establish an international certification scheme to trace African-origin diamonds and eradicate the trade that illicitly funded civil wars, particularly in Sierra Leone and Liberia. NGOs and scholars have pushed for its extension to encompass the entire global gemstone industry.

However, imposing a Kimberley Process-styled mechanism onto the Burmese gem trade is difficult, if not downright unrealistic.

First, Burma's gems and jade industry is far less cohesive than its African diamond counterpart which is still dominated by a monopolistic few, headed by the De Beers consortium. In contrast, there are myriads of local miners, mid-sized companies and state-run conglomerates that are involved in Burmese gem mining, production and trade.

Second, Burmese gems are exported through different transnational trading networks. Rubies are primarily exported through Thailand, though now also increasingly India, while jadestones are almost exclusively disseminated via the Chinese mainland into subsequent Chinese diaspora networks.

Third, surprisingly the Burmese state still does not have a decisive monopolistic leverage over the industry, and there is no one multinational firm powerful enough to influence actors within Burma.

Fourth, Burmese gems are not perceived as contributing to Burma's woes the way diamonds were in Africa. What activists relentlessly denounce is rather the profits scooped up by some Burmese individuals, although empirical numbers are difficult to find.

Last, appalling working conditions in Burmese mines, including use of child labour, along with disquieting environmental issues are what have been singled out in international reports, including by Human Rights Watch. But a local gem-based economy is nonetheless prospering in Burma, promoted by local indigenous actors _ most notably the Kachin, Shan and Burmese Muslim communities _ along with other external regional buyers.

Envisioning a Kimberley Process for Burma would entail concrete cooperation from all parties involved, including the traders of a business dominated by smugglers. Above all, it would require the voluntary participation of Chinese and Burmese authorities. However, the creation of an independent transnational regulation body to trace Burmese gemstones, starting with rubies, and which encourages the adoption of responsible and accountable corporate practices, especially at the local level, would be a constructive start.

The US Burmese JADE Act envisioned such a mechanism, but US policy-makers have never actively pursued this. The West should further its focus on the Burmese gem industry without killing it, and disconnect it from its persistent will to punish the rulers in Naypyidaw.

Renaud Egreteau is Research Assistant Professor with the Hong Kong Institute for the Humanities and Social Sciences at the University of Hong Kong. The views expressed here are solely those of the author.

ISEAS Bookshop - In the Name of Pauk-Phaw: Myanmar's China Policy Since 1948

2011-10-26T13:53:00.000-07:00

Source - http://www.bookshop.iseas.edu.sg/ISEAS/Book.jsp?cSeriesCode=IU32&cCategoryType=

In the Name of Pauk-Phaw: Myanmar's China Policy Since 1948
Maung Aung Myoe, author
Pub Date: 2011
Soft cover ISBN: 978-981-4345-17-0 S$49.90/US$45.90
Publisher: Institute of Southeast Asian StudiesNo. of pages: 238

Table of Contents
In the Name of Pauk-Phaw: Myanmar's China Policy Since 1948
Preliminary pages
1. Introduction
2. Sino-Myanmar Relations 1948-1962: The Years of Charting the Water
3. Sino-Myanmar Relations 1962-1988: Into the Years of Living Dangerously
4. Sino-Myanmar Relations 1988-2010: Towards Closer Cooperation
5. Conclusion
Appendices
Bibliography
Index
About the Author

TBBC - Displacement and Poverty in South East Burma

2011-10-26T12:03:00.000-07:00

Source - http://www.burmalibrary.org/docs12/TBBC-IDP_report-2011(en)-op-red.pdf

Displacement and Poverty in South East Burma/Myanmar - 2011 Survey - TBBC (English)

October 2011

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY (extract): Poverty alleviation has been recognised by the new government as a strategic priority for human development. While official figures estimate that a quarter of the nation live in poverty, this survey suggests that almost two thirds of households in rural areas of South East Burma/Myanmar are unable to meet their basic needs. Impoverishment is particularly severe in the conflict-affected townships of Kyaukgyi and Shwegyin in Pegu/Bago Region and Thandaung in Karen/Kayin State. Comparative analysis with household surveys conducted by the World Food Program suggest that that standards of living in rural areas of the South East are similar to conditions in Northern Rakhine State and far worse than those those reported from the central Dry Zone. This report seeks to increase awareness about the scale of poverty and displacement in rural areas of South East Burma/Myanmar at a critical juncture in the nation’s history...".....With Field Assessments and Situation Updates by: Committee for Internally Displaced Karen People; Karen Offi ce of Relief and Development; Karenni Social Welfare and Development Centre; Mon Relief and Development Committee; Shan Relief and Development Committee...

Thailand Burma Border Consortium (TBBC)

pdf (5.8MB-low resolution; 8.9MB - higher resolution); Zip file - TBBC site - 8.8MB)

Washington Post - Answering Burma

2011-10-24T13:57:00.000-07:00

By Editorial, Published: October 23

FOR MANY YEARS advocates of engagement with Burma’s dictators have argued that economic sanctions, which are intended to promote democratic change in that Southeast Asian nation, could boomerang by forcing the regime into China’s welcoming arms. Even advocates of sanctions, like this page, have acknowledged the risk, since China’s Communist Party has no qualms about dealing with dictators and is hungry for Burma’s natural resources and its access to the Andaman Sea.

Recent changes in Burma, though, suggest that the interaction between sanctions and China relations may be more complex. Like China’s other neighbors, Burma’s rulers may be chafing at China’s increasing assertiveness. They may see a growing advantage in having the United States and its allies play a balancing role. And they may understand that the West will not do so unless Burma’s regime becomes less repressive.

That, at least, is one explanation for recent, welcome changes in this nation of 50 million or so people. The regime continues to rule through intimidation and violence. Lately, though, there have been signs of a thaw. The generals wrote a new constitution, held (mostly fraudulent) elections and installed a (nominally) civilian government. The new government in turn has held a series of meetings with Aung San Suu Kyi, Burma’s foremost pro-democracy leader and a prisoner under house arrest for most of the past two decades. It suspended plans to build a massive dam that was opposed by much of Burma’s embattled civil society — and that was designed to produce electricity primarily for China. Most recently it freed more than 200 political prisoners.

None of these steps is sufficient. Perhaps 10 times as many peaceful opponents of the regime as were freed remain in prison. Aung San Suu Kyi’s party, the National League for Democracy, remains banned from politics. Media are still tightly controlled. The Burmese army continues to commit atrocities, including rape and forcible displacement, against ethnic minorities.

Still, the changes are not minor. The questions, then, are what is motivating them and how can the West encourage more? Some Burma hands speak confidently of a battle between hard-liners and pro-democracy reformers and want to rush to the reformers’ aid. Others, as we suggested earlier, believe that the regime may be looking for a way to lessen its dependence on its giant neighbor to the north. Given the opacity of the regime, any explanation should be viewed cautiously — and any response formulated with modesty about outsiders’ ability to affect change.

For the most part, that is how the Obama administration is responding. U.S. officials have stepped up their level of engagement, including by inviting Burma’s foreign minister to Washington for the first time in memory. But they also have said that substantive change in U.S. policy depends on substantive, irreversible change in Burma’s: a freeing of all prisoners and a change of political environment to allow true debate and full participation. The challenge is to encourage change without too quickly removing the incentives that may be propelling it.

WSJ - Suu Kyi Notes Progress in Myanmar, Urges More Change

2011-10-24T13:43:00.000-07:00

OCTOBER 24, 2011, 3:48 P.M. ET

By WSJ Staff Reporters

Getty Images

Aung San Suu Kyi, seen in a December photo, said her recent talks with government officials 'felt real to me,' unlike previous talks in earlier decades.

YANGON, Myanmar—Dissident Aung San Suu Kyi said a series of reforms under way in Myanmar represents the biggest opening in the repressive Southeast Asian country since the 1980s, but also said she wants to see more changes before she will support easing Western economic sanctions against the military-backed government.

The former political prisoner and Nobel laureate offered her strongest endorsement yet of steps by Myanmar's government in recent months to ease media restrictions, reform its state-dominated economy and pursue talks with the opposition. Ms. Suu Kyi's comments—in an exclusive interview with The Wall Street Journal at her party's ramshackle headquarters in Yangon—come as policy makers around the globe look to her for guidance on how to interpret the latest changes in the resource-rich, strategically important Southeast Asian nation, also known as Burma.

Although she had previously signaled some support for the government's moves, many of her recent public remarks have been brief, leaving followers uncertain as to how far she would be willing to back the current government or endorse easing sanctions.

Transcript

'We can see the way clear ahead more than we have ever been able to.'
—Read more from the interview

She compared her latest talks with the government—which included an August meeting with President Thein Sein—to "where South Africa was in 1990" as it negotiated an end to apartheid, and expressed warm words for Mr. Thein Sein, whom she called "an honest, open kind of person" with a "sincere" desire to overhaul the country.

"I know we are not there yet, but we can see the way clear ahead more than we have ever been able to," said Ms. Suu Kyi, who said her recent talks with government officials "felt real to me," unlike previous talks in earlier decades. She suggested the government is close to meeting her conditions to officially register her political organization—a significant move that would signal her trust in the unfolding system and give Myanmar's leaders a level of legitimacy they crave. She didn't rule out the possibility of running for office in a national vote expected in 2015.

However, Ms. Suu Kyi said it was still too early to give up on sanctions for at least two reasons. Authorities continue to hold an undetermined number of political prisoners, she said, and have yet to fully restore relations with Myanmar's ethnic minority groups, some of which remain locked in violent armed conflicts with the government.

"Obviously now is not the time" to lift sanctions, she said, though she said she expects the government to release more political prisoners soon. The government released about 200 people this month, in a move criticized by human-rights organizations as being too limited.

Ms. Suu Kyi is walking an uncertain road toward reconciliation with leaders in Myanmar, whose strategic significance has increased in recent years as China, India and other countries compete for access to minerals and trade there.

Some dissidents and Western investors want Ms. Suu Kyi to end her longstanding support for sanctions, which block most U.S. companies from doing business there. The rules have been imposed in stages since the late 1990s—largely at her behest—to punish a regime accused of widespread human-rights violations.

Ms. Suu Kyi also is facing pushback from dissidents who doubt the sincerity of the government's reform push, and fear that easing sanctions now could rob the opposition of leverage. Some dissidents have criticized Ms. Suu Kyi for conducting meetings with the government in private—a move she justified as necessary to ensure the process stayed on track.

Political Repression in Myanmar

Track key events in a timeline.

View Interactive

Khin Maung Win/Associated Press

Myanmar officials have said repeatedly in recent months that they are serious about reform.

A government official declined to comment on Ms. Suu Kyi's latest remarks on Monday, because he hadn't seen a full transcript.

It is clear Ms. Suu Kyi will play a crucial role in determining when, and whether, sanctions are removed. After her release in November 2010 from her latest stint under house arrest, which lasted more than seven years, many experts expected Ms. Suu Kyi to take a tough line against the new government. The government, which came to power after a late 2010 election that many Western leaders said was riddled with fraud, is dominated by allies of the military regime that controlled Myanmar since 1962.

Instead, Ms. Suu Kyi has sounded increasingly conciliatory notes on the government, which is eager to win her backing to get sanctions removed.

"By playing her cards very well, she's put herself in a position she hasn't been in in a long time, of being the arbiter," said Sean Turnell, a Myanmar expert at Macquarie University in Sydney. He said he doubts the U.S. would lift sanctions without a clear sign from Ms. Suu Kyi. Given the uncertainties about whether Myanmar's government is serious about changing, "they're looking to her to say yes it is, or it isn't."

U.S. officials have offered cautious support for the changes in Myanmar, which include plans to allow peaceful protests and the organization of labor unions, as well as steps to unblock Internet sites such as the BBC and YouTube. But like Ms. Suu Kyi, U.S. officials have stopped short of advocating a lifting of sanctions until more progress is seen.

Signs of a thaw continued Monday, as U.S. special envoy to Myanmar Derek Mitchell arrived to meet with government leaders for the second time in two months, the Associated Press reported.

Ms. Suu Kyi said she was especially heartened by the easing of media restrictions, which she said is producing the most "open" environment since 1988, when student protests almost topped the military government.

"People feel more relaxed about participating in politics. They aren't frightened as they used to be," she said, speaking forcefully to be heard over barking dogs and trucks rumbling outside her office, in an old building near a strip of furniture shops and weedy lots. Now, she said, activists can take part in the political process "without endangering themselves too much."

Ms. Suu Kyi signaled she may be close to registering her political party, the National League for Democracy, after it was officially disbanded last year for boycotting the country's first election in 20 years. Myanmar officials are eager to see the NLD register: Such a step would bring Ms. Suu Kyi more formally into the political process and, officials hope, provide a tacit endorsement of the current political system, people familiar with the government's thinking say.

The party refused to register last year, objecting to rules that, among other things, prevented political prisoners from being members. "They seem to be changing the bits that we said were not really acceptable in 2010," she said of a draft party-registration law under consideration.

Many of Ms. Suu Kyi's backers oppose registration, which could be tantamount to relinquishing their claim to power. Her party won 1990 elections, Myanmar's last before the 2010 vote, a result ignored by the military regime.

Ms. Suu Kyi said, however, that party leaders long ago gave up on any claim to power from the 1990 vote. "We are in fact not asking for a transfer of power as a lot of people seem to think," she said. "That would not be practical" because many NLD candidates who won office in 1990 are now dead or in exile, she added.

Ms. Suu Kyi appeared lukewarm on the idea of endorsing Myanmar's bid to serve as chair of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations in 2014, a move that has split diplomats across Southeast Asia. Myanmar officials want to take over the rotating leadership seat at Asean, an increasingly influential regional grouping, to symbolize the country's re-entry into the international community. But some Southeast Asian leaders fear it could hurt the organization's reputation and jeopardize ties with the West.

"Assuming the chairmanship of Asean isn't going to do anything about improving the lives of people," she said.

Ms. Suu Kyi blasted the country's legal system, saying "everybody knows" the judiciary is not independent, and that there's too much "crony capitalism." She lamented that despite the relaxation of restrictions on the media, there remains a lack of transparency within the government.

For example, she said it isn't clear whether Senior Gen. Than Shwe, who was the country's paramount leader from the early 1990s until this year, is active in running the country behind the scenes despite his apparent retirement. "Because there is no freedom of information people have to depend on rumors."

But she said she thinks Mr. Thein Sein, who was a military commander before being appointed president earlier this year, wields considerable power, which could augur well for further change.

"People question how much support he has within not just the government but within the army, and that is important—I don't deny that," she said. "But I definitely get the feeling he is in charge, even if he is not in total charge."

—Celine Fernandez
contributed to this article.

Shan Herald - Harn Yawnghwe denies political motivations for trip to Burma

2011-10-24T13:20:00.001-07:00

MONDAY, 24 OCTOBER 2011 17:19 STEPHEN PERRAUD / HSENG KHIO FAH

Coinciding with his first return trip to Burma since his forced exile in 1963, Euro Burma Office (EBO) director Sao Harn Yawnghwe has released a statement in the interest of dispelling rumors surrounding the trip’s purpose.

Harn Yawnghwe with his daughter arriving in Rangoon

While the rumors vary in accusation, Yawnghwe has insisted that the purpose of his trip is simply a private visit, with no fixed political agenda. He has, however, also included in his statement that he is open to meeting with anyone who wants to see him.

Harn Yawnghwe with his daughter arriving in Rangoon

Relocated from Burma at the age of 15 as the son of Sao Shwe Thaike, the first president of Republic of the Union of Burma (1948-1952) Harn Yawnghwe has long been heavily involved in the international community’s pro democracy effort for Burma, and one of the movement’s most visible figures.

Harn Yawnghwe with his daughter arriving in Rangoon

Unsubstantiated rumors that have circulated about possible motivations for his current trip include negotiation meetings for armed opposition groups, the selling of information from opposition groups to the government, and personal business interests. No evidence has materialized to back these rumored motivations.

Sao Harn was to visit his birthplace and town that he shares a name with, Yanwnghwe on Monday. He and his daughter will return on Friday, 28 October.

Myanmar Times, Vol. 597

2011-10-24T13:15:00.000-07:00

October 24 - 30, 2011

Hundreds die in Pakokku flash flood

HUNDREDS of people are dead or missing following flash flooding in the Magwe Region town of Pakokku on October 20 that also left thousands homeless.

Widespread flooding, deaths reported in Magwe Region

PAKOKKU bore the brunt of flooding in upper Myanmar last week, but death and destruction was also recorded in other Magwe Region townships.

More amnesties planned, says Thura U Shwe Mann

PRESIDENT U Thein Sein plans to release more prisoners of conscience “depending on the time and circumstances”, Speaker of the Pyithu Hluttaw Thura U Shwe Mann said last week.

The tip-off that saved two pieces of art from smugglers

TWO paintings by late renowned artist U Ngwe Gaing have been returned to the Ministry of Hotels and Tourism, after a tip-off foiled an attempt to smuggle them out of the country, officials said last week.

Fungus, floods destroy Bago paddy

PADDY farmers in Bago Region are battling a form of fungus, called false smut in English or Than Gee Mhoe in Myanmar. The latest threat to crops comes after extensive flooding damaged fields from late June to mid-September.

Questions over import plan boost car prices

CAR prices have stabilised in the past few weeks after the unveiling of the government’s overage car import substitution plan in early September caused huge fluctuations, car traders said last week.

Teething issues at forex counters: users

USERS of new currency exchange counters in Yangon on Thein Phyu Road are reporting difficulties because of the restrictions placed on changing money there, despite the higher rates on offer.

Emma Thompson stars in feminism talk

Reflects of Moken photo exhibition

A photo exhibition and conference, Moken Reflects, is being held at the French Institute of Myanmar, No 34, Pyay Road, Sanchaung Township, Yangon from October 15 to November 3rd.

Mizzima - ‘In solitary: I wanted to talk with people: that was the biggest desire’

2011-10-24T13:01:00.000-07:00

Monday, 24 October 2011 13:38 Kyaw Kha

(Interview) – Su Su Nway, a rights activist for farmers, workers and child soliders in Burma, was recently released from a 12-year prison sentence in the presidential amnesty. She served a long period of time in solitary confinement. She was in Insein, Kalay and Khamti prisons. While she was in solitary confinement, she urged the authorities to improve prison conditions. Mizzima talked to her after her release about her experiences and current issues.

Human rights activists Su Su Nway, waving, arrives in Rangoon after her release from prison in the recent amnesty. Photo: Mizzima

Question: Please tell us how you were released?

Answer: I was asked to sign a paper, a promissory note 401, which mentioned that if I commit similar offences in the future, I would be sentenced to prison for the remaining terms. I replied why I should sign it. Should I be released with this 401 note, then I can't go I said. I would stay for my full sentence instead of sign the letter. Even after my full term, if I were asked again, I said just sentence me 10 more years instead rather than asking me to sign this. Then the prison chief said it is up to you. And around 9:45 am, they said I will be released even if I don't sign the letter and asked me to pack my belongings. Finally, I was released without signing any agreement.

Q: Was there any negotiations prior to your release by the authority?

A: No. It was said that I would be released before the end of October since around August, and they told me to keep in good health.

Q: How were you were arrested and sentenced?

A: The reason I was arrested is I hung a banner underneath a government poster, saying, "Oppose those axe-handlers relying on the U.S." and "Oppose those who maintain pessimistic views." My younger brothers wrote anti-government themes on a cotton sheet, and I hung it under the government slogan board. The police arrived when I took photos of my work and arrested me. There were no female police when I was arrested.

When police arrived at the scene, my younger brothers tried to escape, but Bo Bo Win Hlaing was arrested. He fell down on the street and the police stepped on his back. Then I said, don't touch my younger brothers, I am Su Su Nway and I asked them to arrest me. One of my brothers escaped, but another one was arrested. Then when they got me, stopped beating my younger brother.

When I said I am ready for their arrest, they didn't approach me immediately. They were surprised and I heard that they were reporting to the higher officials: target one, Su Su Nway is surrendering herself to the police, now they got her and what should they do with her. I don't know what the other side said. We were in separate cars and they brought us to Bahan police station.

There were some discrepancies with the real situation and their report to the court, because they reported that when I was arrested there was a female officer handling the scene. Actually, there was no police officer on the scene. I was arrested by 13 policemen headed by Police Col. U Kyaw Sein.

I don’t remember the charges against me, because they charged me with many offences and accused me with whatever acts they wanted, and I didn't say a word. I was sentenced with two charges to a total 12 and a half-year sentence. The first charge against me was for hanging anti-government posters and it was for eight years imprisonment and another charge against me was for my campaign for releasing all political prisoners, including Daw Aung San Suu Kyi: I was sentenced to four years. Another six-month sentence was for taking a photo.

Q: Please share with us your struggle in the prison as a human right defender?

A: First, after my arrest, I was kept alone in Insein Prison. The ones sent to prison with me were allowed prison visits and parcels. I was denied that right. I protested by entering a hunger strike. After a day of protest, the prison director and the prison staff asked me if I were on hunger strike. I said, yes, and then they said, I cannot be kept here and moved to a room in a separate building. I demanded the right of prison visits and to get parcels, and they agreed. I took foods after three days of protests.

Then I was kept in solitary confinement. I was allowed to get out when my relatives came for prison visits and for official purposes, but most of the time, I was kept in solitary for almost a year. From there, I was moved to Kalay Prison and kept alone. I was allowed prison visits. The deputy prison director came to see me when I was in Kalay. He said, daughter, you are allowed prison visits. You will see your family, and they will come and visit soon. He said it is rather cold in Kalay and asked me to keep in good health. He said the higher authorities decided to send me to Kalay after a meeting. He can't do anything to help me. He just encouraged me to keep in good health.

Q: Were you tortured when you were arrested and during interrogation?

A: Not really. Regional military commander Gen. Wai Lwin came and observed me. He asked his staff to arrange food while in detention. Then Gen. Hla Htay Win came and checked me. He inquired about my condition there. He asked me whether I could help them to lift sanction from Western countries. I said in that case, I have no authority.

He came to see me and my big brother Min Ko Naing at Bahan police station around 12 p.m. They said he met with Min Ko Naing first and came to see me.

Q: You were in solitary in both prisons?

A: When I was relocated to Kalay, there were some doctors and a hospital for medical care. What was worse for me was I was put in solitary confinement. I asked the officials to put me together with other political prisoners. The prison in-charge said they had a large burden in keeping a female in solitary. After four months of imprisonment, I collapsed when I was walking outside of the cell, because I chocked from mucus and I had to take treatments. I was checked with an electro cardiogram and all my clothing was taken off. I asked them don't take photos and when they didn't listen to me, I sent a complaint to the prison in-charge. I told them I am a female and I asked for them to use a female doctor if they have to take ECG and medical examinations next time.

One day, physician Dr. Ko Ko Lwin came and inspected my health. I am always frail, he said, now you are old and you should take Oramin-G. He prescribed the medication with some sleeping aid. One time, when the prison in-charge went to one of the labor camps under his control outside of the prison, the prison medic gave me the wrong medication. He gave me the pills supposedly for medication of the mentally ill girl next door to me.

I complained that they gave me the wrong medication, and as evidence I took the pills. As the pills were for soothing a psychologically active person, I collapsed. I told the prison chief the medic tried to kill me, even though I caused no trouble to others. Two day later, I received the correct medication. I have heard that the medic was sacked from his job. Later I was sent to Khamti Prison.

Q: Did you get proper health care, reading rights and proper living conditions in Khamti Prison?

A: I had a lack of medication for four months, and I felt bad when I got to Khamti. There is no prison doctor in Khamti and no hospital. A medic treated me. I was kept in solitary confinement.

Alone and in ill health, I had to stay strong. I had no one to communicate with and sometimes I was angry with myself. I mainly practiced religion and I prayed all the time. I set up a time-table, what time I will prey, what time I will walk and what time I will read, eat and take a shower, etc. I made myself busy all the. The daily busy schedule offered some respite from living alone.

Su Su Nway is greeted by friends and relatives in Rangoon. Photo: Mizzima
Q: What did you want most during the time of your solitary confinement?

A: Of course, at that time, the most I wanted was a roommate, a friend. I wanted to talk with people, and I wanted to dine together with someone. That was the biggest desire.

Q: What was the main obstacle as a female in prison life?

A: I was insulted for my self-esteem and morals in the prison. I can't answer for those accusations and it was my main difficulty. Even if I explained these accusations, I have no evidence and I can't prove it is the truth.

Q: Why do you think the new government released you and the political prisoners?

A: I think it may be related to President Thein Sein. We all were arrested for our consciousness and for our beliefs. The whole world, the whole country and including Daw Aung San Suu Kyi have asked to release the political prisoners. They selectively released us. There are many prisoners left in the prisons, including ill people and the aged and hospitalized. They must be released. Everybody is suffering from some kind of health problems. All political prisoners deserve to be free.

Q: What would you like to say about your other colleagues including Ko Min Ko Naing who are not released yet?

A: The political prisoners struggling for democracy with their own means, including monks, other political prisoners, Ko Min Ko Naing as well, are originally people with good moral character. As they are good in moral character, they know they have to sacrifice their personal economic, social, education and family affairs for the country's freedom. They could even die in prison. Despite that they know they have a high risk of imprisonment, but they are demanding genuine freedom and democracy in the country. For that reason, I cannot enjoy my release. I could not be happy even if they released all political prisoners.

Q: What do you want to say about the new government?

A: During my four years of imprisonment, I just know the actions of the new government through journals and newspapers as a citizen. If the new government is working for the benefit of the country and its people, we will enthusiastically support it. I wish that is the case. For example, if the government releases all political prisoners, we will surely support the president. Now only a few prisoners are released.

Q: What happened in the prison, when the government announced the first and second amnesty?

A: I heard a loud cheer at first, when the prisoners heard the amnesty announcement through a TV broadcast. It was in Khamti Prison. Then it was said the amnesty was for only a year, they felt disappointed. But they sang songs to encourage those who remained in prisons.

All women and girls cried with their sorrow and loss of hope. I encourage them, don't give up, there will be another round of amnesty. I encouraged them, but they couldn't take food. I encouraged them from my cell. They are waiting for the president's amnesty call. But all felt disappointed.

Usually, two baskets of rice needs to be cooked for all prisoners, but they couldn't take food and they cooked only a basket of rice for 4-5 days. The prison authorities and the political prisoners encouraged them; there will be another round. Later they took food gradually. I can say a lot of people are waiting for state amnesty. Again, now the new order is to release only those in old age and ailing, and they felt disappointment again. They feel they can't rely on the president and the state.

Q: Did you still promote human rights when you were detained in prison? Is there any demand for forced labor in the prisons?

A: The government was aware about me. I worked closely with the ILO. When I was in prison, the authorities carefully demanded labor from the prisoners as well as from the staff. The prison staff are also our citizens as well. They are public servants. All public servants who are working in different departments are also human beings as well, working for their salaries and living. They shouldn't be asked to work day and night, and should allow unfair practices. They have their rights as public servants, but they have to work to fulfill orders because they are afraid to complain. Please don't don’t complain, they said, because we are ordering our own staff to work too. As I demanded these rights for the staff, they now enjoy the right to get holidays on Sunday and other religious and special occasions.

If the prisoners were asked to work on Saturday and Sunday, they should have enjoyed a special pardon, to deduct days from their prison terms. They shouldn't be asked to work from 12 noon until 2 p.m. in the afternoon during off-hours. People deserve proper time to sleep, rest and if they have to work on Saturday and Sunday, they must deduct prison days. I asked for these rights.

The prison authorities worried so much that I would know this information. The other prisoners were allowed to be involved with other political prisoners, but they restricted me, because the prisoners who were dissatisfied with their work could report to me.

Q: After your release, can you use a phone and Internet access for communication?

A: I need a phone right away. For accessing the Internet, my younger brothers help me. I cannot use it now. I will learn the tools that can be useful to my work. Whatever I do, I consult with the elders from the office; even Daw Aung San Suu Kyi was in detention. I have also consulted with Ko Min Ko Naing and others who are clever and smarter than me. Now they are not near me and I will consult with Suu Kyi whatever I do. I will follow her direction.

Q: When is your birthday?

A: I am now 39 years old; I was born on the 16^th of December.

Q: What will you do in the future?

A: Previously I was working for workers, farmers and the rights of child soldiers. I have taken that responsibility at the office. I was terminated from my position of township in-charge at my age of 35. The area I know well is farmers' and workers' rights and child soldiers. That is why they assigned me to these activities. After I take a rest for a while for my health, I will continue the same work. In my free time, I have been trying to get contact with people who are campaigning in the same work. I will go and meet with them for future cooperation.

Q: When you were in prison, how did you feel about your family and friends?

A: I have divided my family and my work. Besides my family, I usually prey for the prisoners of conscience, Aunty Suu and other activists, people who are in exile for their belief and our political colleagues every morning when I get up.

Q: The president verbally welcome people in exile to come back home. What is your opinion; should they return or not?

A: They said they welcomed those who didn't commit any offences. If they (the authorities) practice democracy in the country and welcome these people, anybody can return back. We are not saying now that we are in democracy and come back to the country to work together.

Q: Now there is a law protecting labor rights. Workers can take part in a demonstration?

A: I called the ILO office in Rangoon. They are also happy because I am released. I was reading in newspapers that now the workers are allowed to demonstrate. I cannot go to the office now because of my health problems.

Q: Are there any political prisoners left in Khamti? How about their health situation?

A: In Khamti, there are one female and 10 male political prisoners. There is a monk from Mandalay who is imprisoned for 84 years. All of them are suffering from malaria. For their health problems, some were hospitalized for malaria. I am concerned for them a lot because health care is bad, even the prison staff sometime suffered from the most harmful cerebral malaria.

I prey a lot for them, as many political prisoners are suffering from malaria. I have seen how terrible people suffer from cerebral malaria. I worry for them; Khamti prison is quite different with others.

Q: Some people say with too much labor rights, there could be less foreign investments. How do you see that?

A: It is impossible. Because the labor rights are already promulgated in acts and laws. These acts don't necessarily hamper foreign investments. If they (the authorities) respect labor laws, if there are no violations of the law, we have nothing to fear. That is my opinion from a point of view of a labor activist.

DVB - Espen Barth Eide: ‘Norway is optimistic’

2011-10-24T12:38:00.000-07:00

By AYE CHAN NAING
Published: 24 October 2011

Norwegian Deputy Foreign Minister Espen Barth Eide (Than Win Htut)

When Norway’s deputy foreign minister, Espen Barth Eide, returned from a visit to Burma this month, he told the Financial Times that he “almost left the country thinking they’re moving a little too fast”. DVB asked him to qualify this statement, and get his opinions on the pace and quality of change underway in Burma, as well as the extent to which Norway’s policy towards the government, the opposition and exiled groups will change over the coming years.
You left Burma in October almost thinking that they were moving a little too fast on the reform path. Can you qualify this statement?
Let me first make it very clear that it is definitely not too fast for my taste. I am very positive to the changes and I hope many more changes will happen. My point in this context was that since we know that there are reformers and hardliners, that I hope that reformers are aware of the danger that there could be a backlash because they are pushing on many fronts at the same time. I think it is very positive and I think it is very important now that the international community tries to support that process and tries to lock it in so that a return to the same regime, to the old habit, becomes increasingly difficult. And my point has never been that this is enough, because this is far from enough. But we are seeing the beginning of change which seems to be real.
Can you go into more detail about the changes you have seen?
When I was there in May, I heard many good statements, a lot of good declarations and policy, but we were yet to see that this could actually turn to reality. What I saw now when I visit[ed] last week was, of course, that there is a parliament in place. We have stated again that elections were not free and fair as we prefer them to be but there was a kind of election – there are opposition parties in parliament; the parliament seems to be working, and there is much more press freedom. I checked, for instance, both in May and in October, whether I could access the DVB webpage and in May I could not, and in October, I could, with no problems. We also could sense through talking to industry and civil society and opposition people that there is a new optimism among those who used to be rather pessimistic when it comes to the future of the country. So these are examples of the change and so I left the country with the sense that these are early states, and there is a long way to go, but the direction is good and the change seems to be for real, not cosmetic and just to give a better impression.
Despite signs of change, some in the opposition say that the international community should not lift sanctions or pressure yet. Do you agree?
Well, a lot of times I would agree with that because I have been saying very clearly to the government and several of the ministers that we recognise positive change. We are willing to start talking about a change in the sanctions policy, but we are not ready to do it right now. So there will be no immediate changes, but that the discussions should now begin and we should also talk with the opposition and with the government about where we could begin. And one of the areas where I do think that we should start to move is to increase the work done by international organizations like the World Bank, like the International Monetary Fund, like the United Nations Development Programme. At least they are making the assessment of what future support could be, so that when further change happens, we are ready to move.
So our argument has not been that we are ready to remove sanctions today, but that there must be the beginning of reciprocal policy where we say that given, for instance, the further release of political prisoners, we will start to move from the international community side. After Nargis, I have talked at length both with key people in the United States administration and European Union and also ASEAN and the Indonesian foreign minister about how to work together to start that debate on the international side.
After the trip to Burma this time you went to Indonesia and Thailand. How is Norway going to play the Burma issue internationally?
Although Norway is a small country and quite far away, it is relatively rich and it has a long tradition of supporting democracy in Myanmar or Burma. We do have a role to play and we have to play because we are already there, we are already engaged. We were heavily engaged in the support to Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, to this radio [station]. We are also one of the few European countries who have at the same time had some political dialogue with the government in Naypyidaw, even before it was the military dictatorship. So the role is there. Now the question is, how do we work with the other key players, like for instanceIndonesiaand ASEAN, to find a way to look into the process so that we reward positive developments and by doing that also try to help prevent a return to old practices? ASEAN is important – Burma is part of ASEAN. It may get the chairmanship in 2014 and I think that the experience a country like, for instance, Indonesia has a key player, has in its own history, could be relevant also to Myanmar. You should remember that only thirteen years ago, Indonesia had a military dictatorship. They were taking early steps and for 10 years now, Norway has had human rights dialogue with key people in Indonesia. We think that that has been successful. Something like that could now be done when we see these changes going on in Myanmar.
Back to your trip to Burma: you met various government officials, ministers and so on. What did you discuss, and what was their response?
I saw the foreign minister, Wunna Maung Lwin, and the minister[s] of industry 1 and 2. I saw the environment minister, the deputy minister of tourism, and I also went to the parliament and spoke with U Shwe Mann, who is the speaker of the parliament. We obviously has some different discussions … but what was consistent was that I sensed that this is a reformed government. We all know that many of the members were of the old regime, and explicitly or implicitly there is a real will to move on, probably by the recognition that the old practices don’t work any longer. And I told them that you know you have a long way to go; you are not there yet. But we recognise what you have been doing. And on the more specifics, we have been discussing, for instance, support to an Inle Lake [Shan state] conservation programme. We have been talking about possibility for forest preservation programmes. We talked to the ministry of industry about the possibility to help with privatisation of industry, and building small and medium size businesses, and different opportunities that Norway could have to step up our support.
Since 2008 and Cyclone Nargis, Norway has been increasing its presence in Burma, holding high-level meetings channeling more aid. What areas will Norway invest in in the future?
Let me first make clear that we are not talking about giving money to the Naypyidaw government, that’s obviously not on the cards now. We are talking about support for specifics, concrete programmes. I mentioned Inle Lake, I mentioned forests. Maybe joint thinking about responsible tourism, and when I was visiting Yangon [Rangoon] the last time, I had the chance to speak to Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, about tourism. We agreed that tourism is a good thing – it opens up the country and exposes the country to contacts from abroad. But there is a need for the country to think about what kind of tourism they want; the mass tourism that we see in Thailand with all its negative implications, or more environmentally-friendly sustainable tourism. Interestingly, the minister of tourism is exactly of the same view, that there should be an increased opening but they should take care to look at what kind of tourism.
The other step that we should would be to work through the international organizations where we are on the Board, like the World Bank, and to try to increase the emphasis of the World Bank in thinking about the future of economic development. The government ministers were very honest about the fact that there is will, but not so much capacity, to reform, and I think that should be understood. [Burmese] have been closed off from the world for decades. There is, even if you want to privatise, not that many people who know how to do that inside the system. So external support should, at best, not come from individual countries but from strong monetary institutions which have experience in development.
What did you discuss with Aung San Suu Kyi during your trip?
Well let me first say that, obviously, she’s a very important voice. She has a tremendous amount of followers and support in Norway. And it’s very important to listen to what she says and how she assesses the situation. She is perfectly able to speak for herself, her position. But the way I understood is that while she is very eager to underline that there is a long way to go, she also sees that things are moving and she describes her dialogue with the president as positive and constructive. And it was a very different feel I got this time from the first time we met. So we will see her as strong partner for dialogue, but it’s also very important for me to establish contact with other opposition parties, because there are several parties in parliament. Some of them national parties, others from ethnic minorities, and it’s very important that we listen to the totality of views, not only the government and Aung San Suu Kyi.
As Norway’s engagement with the government increases, will its support for exiled Burmese groups change?
What I really hope is that dialogue with democratic parties, not the least the National League for Democracy [NLD], can actually bear fruit, so that the conditions expected in order for the NLD to re-register can be met when that happens. And I say when, because I think it will happen, whether either now or later. It is logical that more of the work of the opposition should take place inside of the country, simply because the reason that it happened from the outside was that it was impossible to do on the inside. Obviously any country would prefer to conduct its politics at home, and not inOsloandWashington. But we have a long-term perspective on that, so there is no immediate, dramatic change. But overtime, I guess it will be natural for democratic forces to work from [inside] the country. And now the support should be adapted so it supports natural democratic process happening in the country itself.
So gradually Norwegian support will move inside Burma?
Yes, definitely. But of course, this is not something we will be pushing; this is much more a natural adaptation to what I believe is a logical process, because you know we can discuss whether the political space is broad enough. I think it has to be opened up more, but relative to where we were a year ago. Of course, that means that everyone who is engaged in the future of Burma needs to redraw their mental maps. And the old generals have to think very differently from how they used to do, as do the old opposition groups and the ethnic groups and the international community, because what I do know is yesterday’s policies will not work in the future. So, there is a new landscape and let’s see how we can look at them.
Finally, what changes does Norway want to see the government make in the near future?
First and foremost, I would demand the full release of political prisoners. Together with the EU and US, we will be willing to discuss with the government and opposition forces who these political prisoners are, and how many there are. Maybe the number is somewhat reduced from the 2,000 list that we all used. What’s interesting is that the government is willing to talk about the number. Only months ago they did not even recognise the existence of political prisoners. That’s a change, but they have to release more political prisoners.
We also want to see a continuation of the establishment of the parliament as a real independent force. We have seen the relaxation on censorship laws, but ideally censorship should be abolished completely. That has been promised, but let’s see if it happens. But there is room for gradual adaptation, and I think that the international community and the process going on in the country should now be more in unison so that we build on what is already happening and try to help it go in the right direction. This is an opportunity for political change that happens without much violence, where elements of the old system are able to be continued into a new future, very different from the Arab Spring where we’ve seen very violent revolutions, systems collapse, and even wars. And so if it [Burma’s reform] works, it could be an example for others to follow. If it does not work, it will disappoint a lot of people including myself, and I’ve been disappointed before. So I know it can happen. But right now I am quite optimistic that key people in opposition and in government are working to make this real.

Andrew Seith - Burma's Muslims and the War on Terror (2004)

2011-10-23T14:03:00.000-07:00

See full-text of article on Scribd - http://democracyforburma.wordpress.com/2011/10/23/burma%E2%80%99s-muslims-and-the-war-on-terror-rohingya-terrorists/

Chinland Guardian - Chin Pastors Delivered Aid to Kachin Refugees

2011-10-23T13:35:00.000-07:00

23 October 2011: A delegation of six Chin Christian pastors making a humanitarian visit to Kachin State, Burma handed over financial contributions made by Chin churches and communities toward helping conflict-affected Kachin refugees.

The Chin pastors from the Zomi Baptist Convention (ZBC), the largest religious organization Chin State, arrived in Myitkyina on Tuesday. They delivered a total donation of 7,414,000 Kyats (about 7000 USD) during their meeting with counterparts from the Kachin Baptist Convention (KBC) and other Christian pastors from two Kachin churches that look after war-displaced refugees.

The contribution is seen as significant given that the Chins are themselves struggling with abject poverty. A recent study by the United Nations found that Chin State is the poorest among Burma's 14 States and Regions with 73 of its population living under the poverty line.

Rev. M. Thawng Kam, ZBC Chairman, said: "This small amount of financial assistance will not be able to show our true hearts, but it is an expression of our concerns and support for our Kachin brothers in this difficult time."

He also stressed the Kachin locals fleeing military offensives are still in dire need of relief aid and assistance, urging Chin communities worldwide to continue their contribution.

Sources confirmed that the ongoing armed conflict between Burma Army soldiers and Kachin Independence Army (KIA) has escalated in recent days, resulting in the displacement of an estimated 30,000 people.

The humanitarian visit by the Chin religious leaders has received positive responses from the Chin communities worldwide, and is seen as an important sign of solidarity with ethnic Kachins whom the Chin considers their close ethnic kin.

Salai Bawi Lian Mang, Executive Director of the Chin Human Rights Organization (CHRO), said: "The trip was historic and perhaps it was the first time the Chin people took action as a whole in helping other people. The fact that ZBC, the biggest institution in Chin State, made efforts in delivering aid to Kachin State is an important show of solidarity, at a time when we are struggling with serious humanitarian problems among Chin refugees in India, Thailand and Malaysia."

Rohingya Blogger - Letter from America: Muslim Identity and Demography in Arakan

2011-10-23T13:20:00.000-07:00

SUNDAY, OCTOBER 23, 2011 ROHINGYA BLOGGER

By Dr. Habib Siddiqui

Part 5: The Demography Controversy

According to the Encyclopaedia Britannica, the population in Arakan grew to 173,000 in 1831, 248,000 in 1839, 461,136 in 1871 and 762,102 in 1901. For the total population in Arakan to grow to those numbers it would have required yearly annual growth rates of 11.59%, 7.24%, 3.46%, and 2.74% within the first 5, 13, 45 and 75 years, respectively, since 1826. Since the first two growth rates (until 1839) cannot be explained away from natural growth, one must look at huge influx or migration from outside to Arakan as the key contributor to understand the phenomena.

K.M. Saw shares the table below about the demography in Akyab (the first 4 columns).

The above table from Burma Gazeteer, Akyab District (p. 86), clearly shows that there were at least 58,000 Rohingyas, who had identified themselves as Muslims, back in 1871, challenging, thus, Saw’s disingenuous claim that they were a product of the late 19th century British immigration policy for rice cultivation, and railway construction, etc. The Muslim population in the Akyab district should not come as a surprise given the fact that soon after the annexation of Arakan by the East India Company (EIC) in 1826, Mr. Paton, the British official who was the Controller of the Civil Affairs in Arakan, prepared an official report in which he mentioned that the total population of Arakan did not exceed 100,000 of which 60,000 were Maghs (Arakanese Buddhists) and 30,000 (Rohingya) Muslims. Here again, in contrast to Saw’s devious claims, there were already 30,000 Rohingyas living inside Arakan back in 1826. They could not have been planted by the EIC.

As the other three columns in the table above show from my calculation, the Muslim population within the district, which was 21% in 1871, became 33.7% in 1911, i.e., after 40 years. During the same period, Burmese population had jumped from 1.67% to 17.4%. Is this growth reasonable for both these population groups? What could also explain the negative growth rates amongst the Arakanese and Hilly people between 1901 and 1911?

A comparison of the population data in 1871 for the Akyab District vis-à-vis the Arakan Division shows that nearly 60% of the Division’s population lived inside the Akyab District, which had transformed itself from a fishing village in 1826 to a fast-growing town. As noted by the Imperial Gazeteer of India, nearly half the Muslim population of the province lived within the Akyab District, their total number could have been well over 100,000 (or at least 97,092) in 1871, thereby constituting nearly a quarter of the total population of 461,136 (per Britannica). The Muslim proportion in 1901 and 1911 census data is close to Mr. Paton’s report, albeit nearly three-quarter of a century later!

Assuming 62% share of the total population, the Rakhine population inside Arakan could have been at least 286,010 in 1871. It would take the Muslim (Rohingya) and Buddhist (Rakhine) population to grow annually by 2.64% and 3.53%, respectively, to reach those figures of 1871.

It must, however, be pointed out that owing partly to cultural norms of being celibate and/or marrying late, the fertility rate (~ 1%) amongst Buddhists has always been lower than Muslims and Hindus. The figure of 3.53% for the Rakhine Buddhist population is simply untenable by any measure, and could not have been possiblewithout external factors like immigration from outside the territory. On the other hand, as we shall see below, the annual growth rate of 2.64% (between 1826 and 1871) amongst the Rohingya Muslims is not unrealistic at all. Even in this age of family planning (21st century), the yearly population growth rate amongst Muslims is about 2%, and figures as high as 3% are not too uncommon.

Amongst the racist elements within the Rakhine and Burmese Buddhist communities, much fuss has been made about the so-called influx of Muslim peasants from Chittagong. Given the EIC’s prime desire to increase its coffer, it is natural that it encouraged migration to Arakan of the descendants of the former refugees who had settled in Chittagong. Jacques Leider’s research does point out that “The major interest of the East India Company in Arakan lay in the extension of rice cultivation in the Kaladan and Lemro Valleys. This plan succeeded because the scores of Bengal Muslim labourers who had been imported from Chittagong in the middle of the nineteenth century, Akyab, the new capital, had indeed become a major port of export of rice for Europe.” One can notice that Leider mentions scores, and not thousands, of these laborers from Bengal. Such a small influx obviously did not alter the size of Muslim proportion. It is also possible that these seasonal migrant workers returned to Muslim-majority Bengal.

The sudden rise in population within the first few years of British occupation strongly suggests that there were more such ‘immigrants’ from within the Arakanese Buddhist population than any other community. For instance, there were extra 73,000 individuals in Arakan just within the first five years of British occupation, suggesting very strongly that they were recent immigrants from outside, notably from Bengal. Within the next eight years, another 75,000 individuals had added to the list of which probably 60,000 had moved from other places (the remainder being natural growth). As the law and order condition inside Arakan improved, especially after the second and third Anglo-Burmese wars, many other descendants of former refugees moved into Arakan.

As can be seen from the table below the annual growth rate of 7.8% between 1871 and 1911, esp. 10% between 1901 and 1911, amongst the Burmese population cannot be explained through natural process of procreation, and must have been influenced by external factors like migration to Arakan. The positive economic environment in Akyab must have contributed to such an influx of the Burmese people moving into the district. One can also notice that many Arakanese Buddhists had moved away to other places between 1901 and 1911. Thus, it is no accident that their percentage fell to 39.52% of the population in 1911 from being 47.9% in 1901. Could they have migrated to Chittagong Division? Since the 10% increase within the Burmese community seems unreasonable, is it possible that many of the Rakhines had identified them as Burmese and not as Arakanese Buddhists? Whatever may be the real answer, suffice it to say that the huge gain within the Burmese population (56,434) and loss (21,217) within the Rakhine population in 1901-1911 cannot be explained away without considerations or possibilities of such external factors. So is the case with the Hilly and Shan peoples of Arakan.

Interestingly, while Khin Maung Saw cries foul about the declining Arakanese (Rakhine) and Hilly population -- becoming only 45.94% (=39.52+6.42) of the total population in Akyab in 1911, he pretends to suffer from selective amnesia about why there was the loss of 21,217 individuals amongst the Rakhines between 1901 and 1911. His silence about the loss of Hilly people whose numbers had steadily declined by 4557 from 1871 to 1911 (and 1469 between 1901 and 1911) is also strange. Only a half-educated intellectual fraud could ignore such obvious signs!

In the same period (1901-11) the Rohingya Muslim population in Akyab had only increased its share from 32.16% to 33.71%, which can be explained by 1.437% annual growth rate within the community. And this rate is only half the yearly growth rate common amongst Muslim population, and may suggest that some of the residents of the district could have moved elsewhere (including to the Chittagong Division).

As already hinted, amongst many third world countries with a sizable Muslim population the yearly growth rate of 3% or higher is not uncommon. Consider the case of Pakistan (erstwhile West Pakistan prior to 16 December 1971) whose population grew 5-fold from a mere 34 million in 1951, shortly after the partition of India, to 170 million in 2010 (i.e. in six decades). Between 1951 and 1972, when it ceded Bangladesh, the yearly growth rate was 3.2%. Thanks to the family planning program, this rate has significantly come down to 2.5% in the period between 1972 and 2010.

For our purpose here, we need not go all the way westward to Pakistan, but can compare the growth rate of Muslims inside Arakan to that in nearby Bangladesh. As can be seen from the above table, Bangladesh (formerly East Pakistan) had a 2.8% yearly growth rate between 1951 and 1972. Thanks again to the family planning program, this rate has significantly come down to 1.7% in the period between 1972 and 2010.

From the above analysis, it is quite obvious that the growth rate among the Muslims in Akyab (2.841%) between 1871 and 1911 is at par with the trends shown in Bangladesh (2.8%). Thus, all the fuss about massive migration of Muslims from Chittagong or Bangladesh to Arakan during the British rule is not only wrong and baseless, it is racist, to say the least.

Even if we are to assume the conservative estimate of 2.8% growth rate amongst Rohingya Muslims since 1826, it is not difficult to estimate that their number could have grown to at least 313,716 in Arakan by 1911. The Rohingya population in Akyab District, per Saw’s table, would have then comprised only 57% of their total population inside Arakan.

So far from the utterly false claims of racist elements within the Rakhine community, the likes of Khin Maung Saw, Aye Kyaw and Aye Chan, the growth within the Rohingya Muslim community of Arakan was an organic one – a natural one, which had nothing to do with so-called influx or migration from British Bengal or Chittagong. On the other hand, much of the early increase in Rakhine and Burmese population to Akyab and Arakan do clearly show that it was due to external factors like migration.

As every student of historiography knows the borders in those days were much porous, thus facilitating population movement. It is, similarly, not far-fetched to suggest that the many of those lost from Arakan census account of 1911, could well have migrated to places like Chittagong Hill Tract and Cox’s Bazar (southern Chittagong) in today’s Bangladesh.

Conclusion:

In the above analysis of British-era demography of Arakan, in contradistinction to K. M. Saw’s bloated and unsubstantiated claims that while “Arakan was a colonie d'exploitation to the British, but to the Chittagonian Bengalis, Arakan became a colonie de peuplement” what one actually notices is a clear racist campaign by a half-educated Burmese/Arakanese Buddhist extremist who has no knowledge of demography. Unfortunately, Saw is not alone and there are many within his ethnic community that thrives on selling poison pills of racism and bigotry against the Rohingyas of Burma.

As we have noticed, the so-called influx to Arakan was caused by the Rakhines and not Rohingyas (or so-called Chittagonians from Bangladesh). The Rakhines of Arakan should be thankful that the Burmese government has not applied its highly racist and bigotry-ridden litmus test towards citizenship against them, many of whose ancestors had moved into the territory of Arakan from Bengal during the British rule. Their accusation against the Rohingyas of Arakan -- who are the true Bhumi Putras (the indigenous children of the soil) -- is like that of a criminal who accuses its victims.

Regrettably, xenophobia, sponsored by the Burmese government and aided by Rakhaing ultra-nationalists, has caused forced exodus of 1.5 million Rohingya Muslims to seek refuge outside Burma, internal displacement of at least a million, and death of another 50,000. Rohingyas are denied each and every right guaranteed under the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Extra-judicial killing and summery executions, humiliating movement restriction, denial of education, job and healthcare, rape of women, arrest and torture, forced labor, forced relocation, confiscation of moveable and immoveable properties, religious sacrileges, etc., are regular occurrences in Arakan, making the Rohingya people an endangered people of our time who require special protection under international laws.

As regional specialists like the distinguished historian - Professor David Ludden of the New York University (and previously with the Ivy League school - U Penn), have repeatedly shown through the massive scholarly works that bear their names – rather than having one singular origin, South Asia and South-East Asia have always included many peoples and cultures which had different points of origin and departures and followed distinctive historical trajectories. What is promoted by ultra-nationalist, narrow-minded revisionists, pseudo-historians as the single tree of their culture, rooted in their racial and religious myths, is actually more like a vast forest of many cultures filled with countless trees of various sizes, shades, ages, colors and types, constantly cross-breeding to fertilize one another. The profusion of cultures blurs the boundaries of the forest. The so-called cultural boundaries of our time are more like an artifact of modern national cultures than an accurate reflection of pre-modern conditions.

Will the revisionist historians and charlatan scholars of Burma reflect upon this fact and amend their ways to make a more inclusive world in our time?

It is high time that the government of Burma repeal its utterly criminal, morally indefensible, repugnant and inhuman Citizenship Law that has denied the right of citizenship and belonging to the millions of Rohingyas of Arakan, who are the true children of the soil.

************ Concluded *********

[Dr Siddiqui’s book - The Forgotten Rohingya: Their Struggle for Human Rights in Burma – is available from Amazon.com]

Part 1: http://www.asiantribune.com/news/2011/09/18/letter-america-muslim-identi...

Part 2: http://www.asiantribune.com/news/2011/09/25/letter-america-muslim-identi...

Part 3: http://www.asiantribune.com/news/2011/10/09/letter-america-muslim-identi...

Part 4: http://www.asiantribune.com/news/2011/10/16/letter-america-muslim-identi...

Part 5:http://www.asiantribune.com/news/2011/10/23/letter-america-muslim-identity-and-demography-arakan

RFA - Will Suu Kyi Accept Government Post?

2011-10-23T13:06:00.000-07:00

Image by S. Diddy via Flickr

2011-10-23

In her latest weekly conversation with listeners, Aung San Suu Kyi is asked about any possibility of her being given a government position.

Q: There is a lot of hope and speculation with respect to the present political situation in our country. If the government of President U Thein Sein offers you a position in the government, would you accept? And if you do accept, do you think you would be able to better work in the interests of the country and for national reconciliation?

A: When one does not really know if something will happen or not, or under what circumstances it might happen, it would be inappropriate to say whether there are any reasons to accept or not accept. Since we are working to build strong and stable democratic institutions, all of our decisions will be made with a view to ensuring those decisions will support our efforts in building those institutions.

Q: I belong to the Rivers and Streams Network. President U Thein Sein has announced he is suspending work on the Myitsone Dam project. Does the government’s announcement refer only to the Myitsone Dam or to all of the other seven proposed dam projects as well? We have always taken the position that, if possible, all of the projects that could destroy the Irrawaddy River should be stopped. We would also like to know whether the Chinese company that has been working on this project has returned to its own country.

A: The government and I have discussed this matter and have agreed to work together to maintain and protect the Irrawaddy River. We did not refer specifically only to the Myitsone Dam project. I think that they will consider what would be the appropriate thing to do after taking into account the advice and views of experts with regard to the Myitsone Dam. As for the companies that have been working on the project, I would assume that their actions will depend on the situation at hand.

Q: We have been seeing quite a number of politically active Burmese opposition people returning to Burma from abroad following President U Thein Sein’s announcement allowing them to come back. This is happening even though genuine democracy has yet to emerge in our country. Do you think that this movement of exiled opposition figures returning is a positive trend, or will this make the situation more complicated?

A: It is the decision of each individual as to whether or not they should return to Burma. As far as I understand, the president’s announcement did not refer just to people who are politically involved. It also refers to Burmese people who are abroad for other reasons. If one wants to return to Burma with a desire to be politically involved, one should carefully assess whether the situation is conducive before making that decision. Things will become complicated only if one wants them to be complicated. I do not think there will be complications for people who simply return to Burma without an agenda.

Q: On the fourth anniversary of the 2007 Saffron Revolution, about 200 people walked along the streets of Rangoon and said prayers. Some have said that this is not the time for such an act, as this could jeopardize the talks taking place between you and the government. What is your opinion with regard to this issue?
A: I do not think that acts that are carried out to encourage the achievement of democracy in a peaceful and orderly manner will be a hindrance on the road to democracy.

Q: After the emergence of the so-called civilian government, members of government commissions, including members of the president’s advisory committee, and members of the parliament, including USDP member Zaygaba U Khin Shwe and House of Nationalities chairman U Khin Aung Myint, have been openly and courageously giving interviews to foreign broadcasting stations like the BBC, VOA, and RFA. These are media organizations that government newspapers have criticized in the past for creating dissent with “skies full of lies.” What would you say to the way these government officials are using foreign media?

A: I would welcome any change that is made for the better. Not attacking the foreign media is a good thing, and I welcome the fact that things that were done in the past have been stopped because they were found to be inappropriate. Giving interviews to the foreign media is something that should be welcomed. To be fair, democracy supporters are also giving interviews to the press, so it must be said that we are also “using” them.

Mizzima - Is a Burmese anti-war movement possible?

2011-10-23T12:55:00.000-07:00

Friday, 21 October 2011 18:38 Salai Z T Lian

(Commentary) – Since the hero of Burma’s independence, General Aung San, was assassinated on July 19, 1947, every successive Burmese government has failed to honour the Panglong Agreement of the same year, which promised self-determination, democracy, federalism and equality for Burma’s ethnic minorities. After ethnic minorities did not receive the rights promised in the Panglong Agreement, several groups instigated revolution against the Burmese government. More than six decades later the country remains mired in civil war. Yet, despite the duration of the conflicts, anti-war demonstrations have failed to materialize.

U.S. security forces confront protesters on the Mall in Washington, D.C. on 21 October 1967. Photo: Wikipedia.

As the civil wars between ethnic rebel groups, particularly the Kachin Independence Army and Karen National Liberation Army, and Burmese government in the northern and eastern parts of the country intensify, a few questions need to be raised. Does it really matter to the Burmese people if the civil wars end? Are the country’s influential leaders not serious enough in demanding the cessation of hostilities? Or, are the conflicts really not that important to them as they happen in boundary, ethnic regions?

Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, in an open letter to President Thein Sein and leaders of the Kachin Independence Organization, Karen National Union, New Mon State Party and the Shan State Army, has said she is ready to become involved in efforts to resolve ongoing armed conflicts. Moreover, following Suu Kyi’s overture, the Chin National Party, All Mon Region Democracy Party, Phalon-Sawaw Democratic Party, Shan Nationalities Democratic Party and Rakhine Nationalities Development Party also called on the government and ethnic armed groups to stop fighting and declare a ceasefire.

Nevertheless, despite the verbal attestations for peace, there has not yet been significant action. No opposition group has organized mass protests against the violence, even as the country’s civil wars continue. An anti-war movement could in fact serve as another social movement, similar to what transpired regarding the Myitsone dam project, in which Burmese people leave their differences behind and stand united in common cause.

Thousands of Burmese government soldiers are killed and wounded in these conflicts. Likewise, ethnic rebels are killed and injured. But the worst thing is the ordinary people that become victims of the wars – killed, tortured, raped and seeing the loss of their property. All consequences of war are painful indeed. What Burma gets from the civil wars is death, disability, heartbreak, poverty and environmental damage. Haven’t we had enough? Burma’s influential leaders should do something more than verbal urging, prayers or the occasional statement aimed at stopping the wars.

How Americans demanded their government put an end to the Vietnam War may serve as a good lesson for the Burmese. The U.S. anti-war movement began mostly on college campuses, as members of leftist organizations such as the Students for a Democratic Society began organized events expressing their opposition to the war. As a result, by the end of 1965 a small but outspoken liberal minority was making its voice heard. This minority included students as well as prominent artists and intellectuals and represented a growing number of people who rejected the government’s insistence on waging war in Southeast Asia.

On October 21, 1967, a prominent anti-war demonstration took place, as tens of thousands of protesters gathered in Washington, D.C. Also in 1967, the anti-war movement received a big boost when the civil rights leader Martin Luther King Jr. went public with his opposition to the war on moral grounds, condemning the war's diversion of federal funds from domestic programmes as well as the disproportionate number of African-American casualties.

In 1968, Richard Nixon was elected president, promising during his campaign to restore "law and order,” including confronting the increasing political protests. The following year, he claimed in a famous speech that anti-war protesters should not be allowed to drown out the “silent majority” of Americans. Eventually, however, and partially in response to the political mood on the streets, Nixon in 1973 announced an end to offensive operations in Vietnam.

Looking back at the success of the American anti-war effort, if anti-war really matters to Burmese people they have a good chance at also being successful, as President Thein Sein’s government appears more willing to listen to the people compared to previous Burmese governments.

Just as President Thein Sein surprised the public when he suspended the Myitsone dam project, he is similarly capable of putting an end to the mindless civil wars if politicians, activists, artists, writers and the public demand he act in such a manner. If the “Save the Irrawaddy” campaign could meet with success in stopping the Myitsone dam project, why can’t a similar campaign like “Enough Civil War!,” “Stop Killing!” or “Peace is Our Cause” also emerge successful? It is an action responsible Burmese leaders and citizens can undertake today. And the movement can serve as a further reminder to parties involved in the conflict that Burma’s civil wars can only be solved through political dialogue, not through military action.

Burmese should not let their fellow citizens, including children and women, die in the country’s stupid civil wars. Before it is too late they should take action, initiate an anti-war movement, and write a new chapter of Burmese history. That is, if anti-war really matters.

Mizzima - Exile voices in demand among domestic journals

2011-10-22T13:13:00.000-07:00

Saturday, 22 October 2011 12:04 Tun Tun

New Delhi (Mizzima) – In another cautious indication of the opening up of Burma’s domestic media environment, interviews with exile Burmese media figures and activists are proliferating in domestic journals.

Exile voices heard in domestic media. Photo: Mizzima

The publication of interviews with the Democratic Voice of Burma’s Chief Editor Aye Chan Naing, Irrawaddy Editor Aung Zaw and Mizzima’s Managing Editor Sein Win were all this month permitted by Burma’s censor board.

“We think the government’s policy is totally changed. It started around five or six months ago. A lot has changed,” an editor whose journal was allowed to publish interview with the head of an exile media told Mizzima.

Popular subjects for the interviewees included sanctions, whether exile media groups are looking to return to Burma, the Myitsone dam controversy and the relationship between Aung San Suu Kyi and Naypyidaw.

Referring to the newfound freedom in publishing interviews with exile media figures, one Rangoon editor commented, “I think it is allowed at present since they said all exiles are allowed to return home. Because of this change, I think they allow the interviews with exile people.”

He added that interviews with exiles are not only for promoting the journals, but also to test the attitude of censors regarding sensitive subjects such as the call for exiles to return to Burma.

On 17 August President Thein Sein announced that exiles who want to return and participate in the country’s development can do so by communicating their intention with respective state and regional governments.

However, at the time of this announcement the censor board still did not approve publication of interviews with exile figures.

“Allowing interviews with persons from the exile media is strange. In the coming period, they [the Burmese government] have a lot to talk about with the international community. So, I think that is why they do things [like permitting the publication of interviews with exiles],” said the journal editor.

Naypyidaw is seeking the ASEAN chair in 2014 as well as the abolition of sanctions and resumption of international assistance. However, international criticism of the exact nature and extent of changes being implemented by the Burmese government continues to hamper these aims.

“The government is trying to sell their image. It is the first impression people will have, so they are giving their best. They want to make it appear that they abolished all things of the past and are now doing their best,” added the Rangoon editor.

Some members of the exile-based Burma Media Association (BMA) believe that the redundancy in questions circulated to exile media figures is part of a strategy by the government to measure the attitude of the exile media to changes inside the country.

“While it appears that the government has conceded something to some extent, at the same time they want to measure the attitude of journalists in these media organizations. I think they want to evaluate them,” Zin Linn, vice president of BMA, told Mizzima.

Journals permitted to publish the interviews are commonly held to be controlled by individuals close to the government and include Popular, Yangon Times, Eleven and publications of the United Media Group.

Derek Tonkin - Burmese Mythology

2011-10-22T12:43:00.000-07:00

Myanmar Briefing Note No. 8
22 October 2011
Burmese Mythology

While there are those pundits who couldn't wait to proclaim that absolutely nothing had changed in

Myanmar in the wake of the November 2010 elections, even they have in recent weeks been obliged

to acknowledge that much has happened which they had not expected. But they take solace in their

conviction that such changes as have occurred are only skin deep, window dressing, cosmetic, even

illusory.

The pace of events is such, however, that UN Special Rapporteur Tomás Ojea Quintana's midSeptember report to the UN General Assembly has already been followed by an amnesty which has

included prisoners of conscience, the suspension of the Myitsone Dam project on The Irrawaddy

which has had implications for relations with China, and the passing into law of a new Labour

Association Act which allows the establishment of trade unions and recognises the right to strike.

In these circumstances, we should not be surprised that credit for what is now happening in

Myanmar is already been sought in the wider world. Australia has already staked a claim, following

Foreign Minister Kevin Rudd's visit in July. "Australia has done much to promote change in Burma;

we are the second-largest aid donor and have been in the vanguard of the policy of constructive

engagement now bearing fruit," declared 'The Australian' in an editorial on 18 October. This might

surprise the countries of the Association of South East Asian Nations who rather thought they were

the architects of constructive engagement.

For those avenging angels Human Rights Watch, Washington Director Tom Malinowski argued in a

discussion recently hosted by The Heritage Foundation that no laws had changed and no institutions

had yet been reformed, but that if and when reforms did come, they would "vindicate the policies

that the U.S. has pursued", but he also cautiously reminded the audience that there is still "a beast

of a regime" that is not going to "voluntarily negotiate its powers and privileges without a struggle."

For some, then, the changes in Myanmar are due to their enlightened engagement. For others,

serious reform has yet to come, but if and when it does, it will be because of their resolute policies

of economic and political pressure. But can we all seriously claim equal justification for our so

divergent policies?

The reality is that changes are occurring in Myanmar because the new administration has willed this,

not because they have been compelled to reform. Against strong Western opposition, the former

State Peace and Development Council pushed through remorselessly the fourth, fifth and sixth

stages of their seven-stage political Road Map, namely, the Referendum on the 2008 Constitution,

the Elections on 7 November 2010 and the convening of the Assemblies on 31 January 2011. From

this position of strength, the new administration can go ahead as fast as it dare with the seventh

stage which is "to build a modern, developed and democratic nation". 2

The Government knows where its best interests lie and it has certain goals to achieve, which are

rather more substantive than just hosting the 2013 Asian Games, taking the ASEAN chair in 2014 and

winning the 2015 elections, important as these particular interests are. None of them, even taken

together, is as vital as the Government's awareness of the need to assure the security and stability of

the State.

We are at the same time witnessing a long overdue challenge to many of the myths about Myanmar

which have grown up over the years. Most of us have accepted uncritically that there were some

2,000 'prisoners of conscience' as defined by Amnesty International, a phrase which is now in use in

the Burmese press and even by officials. It would now seem that there may be no more than 600-

700 such prisoners after all, and that just short of half of these could have been released under the

recent amnesty.

Even UN Special Rapporteur Tomás Ojea Quintana is not immune, for he refers in paragraph 13 of

his latest report to the creation of a non-existent, activist-inspired supra-constitutional "Supreme

State Council".

The only safe bet whenever you come across an article about Myanmar is to challenge every word

you read.

Derek Tonkin

Chairman - Network Myanmar

www.networkmyanmar.org

Rohingya Blogger - The Arab Spring and Myanmar

2011-10-20T12:03:00.000-07:00

Image by carlosfotos1http://carlosbartilottimatos.blogspot. via Flickr

THURSDAY, OCTOBER 20, 2011 ROHINGYA BLOGGER

By David I Steinberg

The Arab Spring, the several successful and still ongoing rebellions against authoritarian governments in the Middle East, have a mutual characteristic beyond that of having occurred in Arabic-speaking societies. All originated from below - from populations that have been frustrated by severe political and social constraints often compounded by clear economic injustices.

Beginning in Tunisia with the self-immolation of a street vendor, the movement spread to a half-dozen societies. Hope for real and positive changes in those countries is apparent both in the region and abroad. The power of such movements is inspiring. Perhaps, some thought, this would affect other authoritarian states outside the region and usher in a new democratic wave. Myanmar and North Korea were prominently mentioned in the media.

A distinguished American who visited Myanmar in the summer of 2011 commented that he thought the Arab Spring would also affect Myanmar. But this view neglected to consider the unique circumstances that make such a revolution from below unlikely there in the near term.

Contrary to many expectations that significant changes could not take place under a new but military-controlled government installed in 2011 in a flawed election and ominously designated by its leadership as a "disciplined-flourishing democracy", important and positive developments are occurring and more are promised.

These positive signs should in no way obscure where essential power rests: the military have built into their new constitution the elements of perpetual, but civilianized, control yet within the context of a somewhat more plural and popularly-responsive society.

Contrary to the Arab Spring, the potential changes in Myanmar are coming from the top. Belatedly, the military-in-mufti leadership seems finally to have understood that to keep essential power, they had to institute some socio-economic liberalization and even some modest degree of political pluralism.

Burma/Myanmar has tried revolts from the bottom - the tragic people's revolution of 1988 that failed against a single-party socialist military-dominated government only to have it replaced by a coup of other military personnel. The incipient 2007 "Saffron" revolution of Buddhist monks, widespread and important demonstrations but not a revolution, was also brutally suppressed when it became overtly political.

The history of modern East Asia demonstrates that the democracies that exist in that region were largely instigated from the bottom. "People Power" in the Philippines in 1986 that overthrew dictator Ferdinand Marcos; the popular, peaceful uprising in South Korea in 1987 that eliminated Chun Doo-hwan's authoritarian rule; demonstrations against the military in Thailand on numerous occasions; and the fall of Suharto in Indonesia in 1998 all started at the bottom of the power structure.

Only in Taiwan did president Chiang Ching-kuo, to preserve his regime, recognize that change was necessary and due, and institute reforms from the top of the political hierarchy.

The potential reforms in Myanmar are as widespread as they were unexpected. From accounts inside that state, the people generally seem to be prepared to await the possibility of political and economic evolution of their past sorry state. Economic reforms are planned. Widespread poverty is admitted officially for the first time in a half-century. Corruption is recognized as a problem.

Human rights are discussed. Minorities are given a bit more say in their affairs. Censorship has been eased, and labor unions are to be allowed. A major, and hated, Chinese dam project was stopped by the president because of public sentiment. Many political prisoners - whose existence has been denied for so long - have been released, and even Myanmar dissidents abroad have been invited back, with a few tentatively starting to return.

These planned changes are fragile, for they cut into the vested interests of many, including high-level military officials and their civilian colleagues, who prefer the old ways. So we cannot but remain concerned for the diverse peoples of Myanmar. Inside that country, the new administration has a short but indeterminate period in which it must deliver on many of these proposed reforms.

The people must feel there is a future for them that is not only though military-controlled channels. That period is not indefinite, however. Even if the reforms are implemented and life begins to improve, the ultimate power will still rest for some indefinite future with the military. It is only when diverse, alternative channels of mobility and access to better living conditions occur that the military may relax its ultimate control and modify its constitutional powers. But other states have demonstrated that life can improve under less than pristine democratic conditions. Perhaps that is a realizable goal for Myanmar in the near future.

Without illusion and hyperbole, therefore, the outside world should encourage such changes. The alternative in Myanmar of the traumas and deaths in a Syria or Yemen-like environment should be avoided. Although they had long planned for a civilianized state, perhaps the Myanmar military understood the lessons from the Middle East: if the leadership refuses to reform, society may force change. It may not be the revolution that some have desired, but it does bring the possibility of positive change in Myanmar.

David I Steinberg is Distinguished Professor of Asian Studies, School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University. His latest book is Burma/Myanmar: What Everyone Needs to Know (Oxford).

RFA - ASEAN Urged To Delay Decision

2011-10-20T11:41:00.000-07:00

2011-10-19

Lawmakers say Burma is not ready to chair the organization.

AFP

Burmese Foreign Minister Nyan Win (L) and Marty Natalegawa during an ASEAN meeting in Hanoi, July 20, 2010.

A group of legislators from member states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has requested that any decision to designate Burma as chair of the regional grouping in 2014 be put off until there are clear signs that the country is moving towards democracy.

ASEAN Inter-Parliamentary Myanmar Caucus (AIPMC) Executive Director Agung Putri Astrid said the lawmakers from Malaysia, Indonesia, Singapore, Thailand, Philippines, and Cambodia could not endorse Burma’s bid until the government makes concrete efforts at reconciliation with the country’s ethnic groups and political opposition.

“The minimum conditions for real democracy are ongoing, so we would like to suggest to ASEAN that they delay the decision,” Astrid said.

ASEAN delayed a decision on a request by Burma to be ASEAN chair nation during the grouping’s previous summit in Jakarta in May this year, two months after the country’s military junta handed power to a new government elected in the first polls in two decades.

Marty Natalegawa, the foreign minister of Indonesia and current ASEAN chairman, is scheduled to visit Burma at the end of the month to meet government and opposition leaders and other groups as part of information gathering ahead of a decision on Burma’s request, possibly to be made at the ASEAN summit in Bali from Nov 14-19.

“We would like to see Mr. Marty, as the chairman, show ASEAN as a credible organization which will promote democracy in the region,” Astrid said.

She said that while the AIPMC acknowledged recent reforms initiated by Burma’s nominally civilian government led by President Thein Sein, including last week’s release of some 200 political prisoners, more must be done to “ensure real democracy” in the country.

“Even though we really welcome the changes that have happened during the last weeks, including the release of political prisoners and relaxing of restrictions regarding freedom of expression … we see also that those measures and decisions made by the president are not enough to arrive at conditions that we consider positive for democratization,” Astrid said.

“We see the changes, but we don’t find a platform or a firm strategy to ensure that democracy is on the way. Particularly, we don’t see any measures taken by the government to ensure that the process of the dialogue regarding the conflict with the ethnic groups is starting,” she said.

“If these [minimum] conditions cannot be achieved, then we consider that it may be best for ASEAN to delay the decision for approving Myanmar’s [Burma’s] seat … until a certain situation is achieved, particularly regarding the road to reconciliation.”

Reforms fall short

Thein Sein, seen as a reformer in a newly elected government largely consisting of retired military generals, has launched talks with the opposition, including pro-democracy leader Aung San Suu Kyi, and adopted other reforms in an apparent bid to get mostly Western nations to dismantle longstanding political and economic sanctions.

Last week, the government released the first batch of 6,300 prisoners under an amnesty program. Only a small percentage of those released were prisoners held for political activities, with numbers varying from at least 120 to as many as 300, rights groups said.

The groups say there are about 2,000 political prisoners, but the government says they make up only a few hundred.

It is believed that the sanctions will be fully lifted only if all key political dissidents are released and the government forges peace with armed ethnic groups seeking greater autonomy, analysts say.

“The ethnic issue tends to be sidelined from the whole process, so we cannot agree that the release of political prisoners is equal to democracy,” Astrid said.

“We want to see, besides the release of the political prisoners, that the government has real steps to start a peace dialogue and reconciliation with the ethnic groups, as well as with the opposition and particularly the National League for Democracy (NLD) and Aung San Suu Kyi,” she said.

Nobel laureate Aung San Suu Kyi’s NLD did not participate in elections but remains a formidable force in Burma.

Sanctions to remain

This week the United States also signaled that the reforms by the Burmese government were still not enough for sanctions to be lifted.

Derek Mitchell, the U.S. special representative and policy coordinator for Burma, said that there were signs that Burma may be moving toward greater openness but that it is unclear whether it has embarked on genuine, thorough-going political reform.

"We have seen encouraging signs over time," said Mitchell, noting that Burma had not, however, curbed violence against ethnic minorities in the north and east of the country.

"What we're looking for is a release of all political prisoners without condition to really send the signal of genuine commitment to democracy in the country," he said.

Reported by Kyaw Min Htun for RFA’s Burmese service. Translated by Khin May Zaw. Written in English by Joshua Lipes.

DVB - Arrests highlight Burma-China gun trade

2011-10-20T11:25:00.000-07:00

By FRANCIS WADE
Published: 20 October 2011

Police in Burma inspect a cache of weapons seized from Kokang rebels following fighting in August 2009 (Reuters)

Chinese police have busted a ring of gun smugglers they claim have been running weapons into Tibet and the southwestern region from northern Burma for at least two years, sparking a renewal of fears about security along the shared border that Beijing has long eyed with concern.

The state-run People’s Daily in China said yesterday that 17 people had so far been arrested in a crackdown that began nine months ago. Their nationalities have not been disclosed, nor the precise destination of the weaponry, only that guns were sold “to several predominantly Tibetan regions”. Two men linked to the racket were arrested in March this year in Yunnan province, which borders northern Burma, and the remaining in Lhasa.

“Yunnan police said that, in recent years, people vying for big money have started trafficking firearms, taking advantage of loose gun control laws amid arm conflicts in northern Myanmar [Burma],” the paper said.

Little is known about the origins of the ring, which appears to have capitalised on the porous 1370 mile frontier between China and Burma and along which myriad armed conflicts have generated a surplus of weaponry.

Aung Kyaw Zaw, an analyst based on the China-Burma border, said the trade was “nothing new”, and claimed the guns may have originated from any of the various ethnic armies and militias operating in northern Burma. He cited the August 2009 fighting in which Burmese forces overran a Kokang rebel group in the north as helping to fuel the trade over the past two years, given the excess of arms that the retreating Kokang left in their wake.

Moreover, armed groups such as the Wa are known to produce their own weaponry, in addition to an historical supply line from China, and have vast stores of guns and heavy artillery. The somewhat lawless nature of Burma’s northern border regions, much of which are controlled by anti-Naypyidaw groups, means that monitoring of illegal cross-border trade is either difficult, or done with the acquiescence of border officials.

Beijing has warned Burma on several occasions that stability along its side of the shared border is of paramount importance, particularly given extensive Chinese business interests in the Kachin and Shan states. The Burmese military has ramped up a campaign to secure these areas, sparking heavy fighting with rebel groups that, in Kachin state at least, is reaching an intensity not seen since a raft of ceasefires were signed in the late 1980s and early 1990s.

Reports from local Kachin media claim that China has sent up to 2,000 troops to its border with Burma. Speaking with DVB today, La Nan, the spokesperson of the Kachin Independence Army (KIA), which is battling Burmese forces along the frontier, said the deployment may be aimed a stemming a possible overspill of fighting into China. One Chinese battalion has been placed in the town of Jang Khawng, over the border from the KIA stronghold of Maijayang.

China has also noted with concern an attack last week on two cargo vessels travelling along a stretch of the Mekong River between Burma and Laos, which is officially controlled by Thailand but where Burmese militia groups are known to operate. Allegations that the attack, which left 12 Chinese nationals dead, was the work of the Wa were categorically denied in a statement released by the group earlier this week.

DVB - Burma to drop ban on satellite TV

2011-10-20T11:18:00.000-07:00

By SHWE AUNG
Published: 20 October 2011

Burmese haven't been able to receive satellite licences since 2005 (James Mackay)

Licences for satellite television receivers are likely to be issued again in Burma following a six-year ban claimed at the time by observers to be an attempt to control the flow of information into the country.

The notification came from communications minister Thein Htun after a question about the possibility of reintroducing satellite permits was raised in parliament. The minister said the process would take time, although state media appeared optimistic that it would be successful.

Phone Myint Aung, an MP for the opposition National Democratic Force, quoted the minister as saying that that the law regarding the licences has already been drafted.

The move is part of a reshaping of the communications law, and follows introductions or amendments to a number of laws that signal the government is loosening its vice-like grip on Burmese society.

Most satellite users in the former capital Rangoon are without permits. Locals there welcomed the news as a sign that the media environment is further opening up, following the relaxing of an internet ban on certain news website, including DVB.

The ban in 2005 was not the first such restriction by the government – in 1993 it enacted a ban that wasn’t lifted until 2001, and during those eight years only around 2,000 satellite dishes were legally in use, mostly by hotels and businesses.

Despite the periods of prohibition on satellite licences, exiled media such asDVB has still managed to broadcast into the country. Government ministers are believed to garner much of their information from these independent sources, and thus have been reluctant to block the service.

Irrawaddy - Indonesian MPs Give Burma Reform Lessons

2011-10-19T15:40:00.000-07:00

By BA KAUNG Wednesday, October 19, 2011

Burmese President Thein Sein, left, meets his Indonesian counterpart Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono in Jakarta in May.

Burma can learn from both the successes and failures of Indonesia during its transition from military rule to democracy, members of Indonesia’s parliament told Burmese presidential advisers for legal and political affairs during a meeting in Jakarta, Indonesia on Sept 27.

According to notes from the meeting obtained by The Irrawaddy, the Indonesian MPs told the Burmese delegation that one of the first steps in Indonesia's own transition to democracy—which began in 1998 after the fall of former dictator Suharto—was making significant constitutional amendments to protect human rights and provide a framework for economic and political reforms.

The Indonesian legislators acknowledged that their country made a mistake by failing to bring to justice those responsible for gross violations of human rights during the Suharto regime and then letting them hold positions in the new government.

As a consequence, the Indonesian MPs said, such persons remain obstacles to resolving conflicts, particularly with respect to the management of the country's natural resources.

One of the issues the Burmese delegation raised in the meeting with the Indonesian MPs was how to strengthen Burma’s Parliament and public administration.

The Indonesian MPs responded that the first step should be to give Burma’s Parliament power under the country’s Constitution. They said that even though the Indonesian parliament was previously just a rubber stamp for the government, the amended Indonesian constitution gives the parliament the authority to oversee the budget and make law.

The Indonesian MPs also said that increasing the capacity of civil society should take place simultaneously with increasing the power of the parliament. During the early stages of reform, they said, Indonesia’s leadership was aware that it was important to listen to civil society and acknowledged that if the government sector is weak, the civil society should be allowed to play its role. In addition, civil society has been allowed to play a role in the legislative process, such as in drafting the law for the protection of labor rights.

Dr Nay Zin Latt, a political adviser to Burmese President Thein Sein who was part of the Burmese delegation, told The Irrawaddy on Tuesday that the Indonesian MPs warned that Burma's reform process could be protracted if the country has a weak parliament and civil society sector.

“We understand that the reform process cannot go very smoothly with a weak civil society. We have more plans underway for the process,” he said.

Nay Zin Latt also suggested that just as post-Suharto Indonesia saw the gradual end of military representation in its parliament, the same thing can be expected to take place in Burma's national parliament, where 25 percent of the MPs are designated by the military.

But regarding the question of bringing to justice those who committed human rights violations in the past, Nay Zin Latt pointed out that change in Indonesia stemmed from a grassroots public movement, whereas in Burma change is being driven from the top down by government leaders, including President Thein Sein, who are former military officials. Therefore, attempting to bring members of the previous military junta to justice may actually prolong the reform process, he said.

However, the Burmese delegation did inquire about ways of coping with corruption, and in response the Indonesian MPs acknowledged that this has been an issue that the achievement of greater degrees of democracy and openness have not solved in their country.

The Indonesian MPs warned there cannot be a gap between moral and political commitment if the problem of corruption is to be adequately addresses—there must be a strategy that focuses on prevention, not just repression, and a budget that allows the strategy to be carried out. In addition, the ruling party must address the issue with impartiality if they expect law enforcement officials to do so as well.

The Burmese delegation also sought advice on how to deal with requests for autonomy by ethnic groups in different states and regions, and expressed a fear that autonomy would allow those states with the most natural resources to develop ahead of the others.

After the meeting, the Burmese delegation reportedly visited Indonesia's Ache Province, which was previously engaged in a decades-long civil war with the Indonesian government but was granted autonomy a few years after the country began its political transition to democracy. The 2005 agreement between the Indonesian government and the separatist Free Aceh Movement (GAM) resulted in Aceh receiving a special regional status, and former GAM guerrillas came to power after winning the first post-conflict elections.

This was not the first time that the Burmese government had sent a delegation to study the Indonesian system and seek advice from Indonesian officials. Former junta chief Snr-Gen Than Shwe sent delegates to Jakarta to study the Indonesian model of dwi-funsi (two functions) which gives the military a dual role in defense and politics.

Under the Indonesian constitution, there is an elected president and legislature, but the army has a constitutional role in ensuring the security and integrity of the nation and until 2004 had representation in the legislature. Than Shwe’s delegation studied the structure and function of the Indonesian constitution for an example of how a military-run government can transition to a civilian government with the army retaining a direct role in running the country.

In addition, when forming the Union Solidarity and Development Association (USDA), a mass pseudo-social organization, the Than Shwe’s junta used as a model the Golkar—Indonesia’s purportedly apolitical body that was formed in 1964 with the backing of senior army officers and is now the largest political party in the country. Similarly, in 2010, the USDA was transformed into the Union Solidarity and Development Party, which dominated the 2010 election and now holds a majority of the seats in Burma’s Parliament.

Mizzima - ‘The doctrine a person embraces is important’ – Min Ko Naing

2011-10-19T15:27:00.000-07:00

Wednesday, 19 October 2011 12:55 Zwe Khant

New Delhi (Mizzima) – “The location of a person is not important, only the doctrine the person embraces is important.” That’s the 49^th birthday message of 88-generation student leader Min Ko Naing, who is serving a 65-year prison term in Kengtung Prison.

Well-wishers at the birthday party for Min Ko Naing, who is serving a 65-year sentence in Kengtung Prison. Photo: Mizzima

His 49^th birthday ceremony, on Tuesday, was held at Thaminemyoma Monastery in Insein Township in Rangoon. He sent the birthday message from his prison cell, adding: “My birthday party should not be only for me; it should be a ceremony of remembrance for all.”

Mi Mi Lwin, Min Ko Naing’s sister, told Mizzima: “He wrote the message as a remembrance.” Min Ko Naing was arrested on August 21, 2007, for leading massive protests against a hike in fuel prices. He was not included in the prisoners released under the recent presidential amnesty.

The birthday ceremony was attended by NLD leaders including Aung San Suu Kyi, NLD Vice Chairman Tin Oo and central committee member Win Tin. The newly released prisoners Zarganar and rights activist Su Su Nway also attended. Also present were diplomats from France, Britain and the U.S. embassies, ethnic leaders, political parties and young people. About 2,000 people turned out for the event.

Mi Mi Lwin said, “I can’t say how sad we feel because his birthday party was held without him. I hope we can hold his birthday party with him next year. We hope it every year.”

During the 1988 pro-democracy uprising, Min Ko Naing was elected chairman of All All Burma Federation of Student Unions (ABFSU). He was arrested in March 1989 for his political activities and released in 2004. Then in September 2006 he was detained again and released in January 2007. He was arrested again during the protest against the hike in fuel price.

To mark the birthday, guests released helium balloons and doves and prayed for the freedom of political prisoners. Opposition leader Suu Kyi, comedian Zarganar and 88-generation student leader Phyo Phyo Aung spoke.

Suu Kyi said that she wished all political prisoners would be released and urged all people to work for their freedom, according to 88-generation student Myat Thu, who organized of the ceremony.

Families of political prisoners gave 5,000 kyat (about US$ 6) to each of more than 100 recently released political prisoners who attended the ceremony, which included a birthday song and poetry recitation.

Myat Thu said, 42 publishing houses donated books and the books will be sent to 42 prisons to open libraries. The total value of the books was more than 2.7 million kyat.

More than 20 portraits of Min Ko Naing were displayed at the ceremony.

“After the ceremony, only three portraits remained. Some people asked for the portraits by saying they loved Min Ko Naing. They asked for the portraits from other people, not from me. I’m sorry to lose the portraits,” said artist Myo Yan Naung Thein, who painted the portraits.

The new ABFSU that was reorganized in 2007 also sent a message, saying “We students pay deep respect to Min Ko Naing; the role of the ABFSU is still active.”

NLD-affiliated networks in Kachin and Karen states, Sagaing and Mandalay regions and Chauk and Yaynanchaung in Magway Region also held ceremonies to mark his birthday.

“According to the information we have, political prisoners will be released in three batches. In the first batch, Min Ko Naing was not included, but Zarganar was included. We heard that Min Ko Naing will be included in the last batch,” 88-generation student Myo Yan Naung Thein said.

Burmese pro-democracy activists in New Delhi held a ceremony to mark the birthday in the office of the Women Rights and Welfare Association of Burma. Food was donated to Buddhist monks and prayers for political prisoners were recited by people of various religions.

DVB - Malaysia and Burma plan migrant swap

2011-10-19T15:22:00.001-07:00

By JOSEPH ALLCHIN
Published: 19 October 2011

Thousands of Burmese refugees are kept in detention facilities such as this in Lenggeng, Malaysia (Reuters)

The Malaysian government has said that it plans to “swap” detained migrants with Burma, causing concern among rights activists about the safety of those returning to Burma.

Malaysian Home Minister Hishammuddin Hussein was quoted in the local press as saying the scheme will “help reduce the numbers [of migrants] in our detention centres.” Kuala Lumpur-based rights activist Pranom Somwong has said that serious problems over “transparency” with such dealings for both countries make the scheme “unacceptable”.

She raised questions about the safety of detainees, many of whom she believes would or should be classified as asylum seekers due to the deplorable record of the Burmese regime, and that many Burmese had fled for political as well as economic reasons.

Malaysia is a popular destination for Burmese seeking work and safety, with large numbers of ethnic Chin and Rohingya attempting to gain asylum in the country.

The Rohingya minority group from western Burmaare systematically discriminated against, with the majority refused even citizenship papers. Burma’s immigration minister, Khin Yi, told parliament recently that the Rohingya in the Maungdaw township of Arakan state are “assumed to be Bengalis … [who] have shared common religion, culture, appearance and language with their counterparts [in Bangladesh].”

Malaysian rights group Suaram meanwhile described the Burmese government as “tyrannical” and “undemocratic,” and condemned the scheme.

Malaysia is home to approximately 400,000 Burmese with around 87,000 recognised by the UN refugee agency, although Malaysia’s ongoing refusal to sign the 1951 treaty on refugees means many of these are still harassed by authorities. Human Rights Watch said last month that a pledge by Prime Minister Najib Tun Razak to do away with repressive emergency acts that include detention without trial must be followed through.

Pranom claims that few of the details of the deal are known. This is a problem that often plagues refugees and asylum seekers, with a lack of clarity on such schemes leaving migrants in a legal limbo.

Malaysia’s Bernama newspaper quoted Hishammuddin as calling for “cooperation” to make the “repatriation process run smoothly”. He also reportedly called for a joint working committee between the two governments. The Burmese labour ministry has recently sought to regularise management of the large numbers of Burmese who migrate for work.

Malaysia is dependent on migrant labour for its manufacturing sector but has faced criticism over its handling of migrants. In 2009 the US State Department downgraded the country to a Tier Three nation because of allegations that officials had taken bribes and sold detained migrants.

Little information as to who the Burmese would send back to Malaysia as part of the “swap deal” was made available. Few Malaysians are believed to be detained in Burma.

DVB - Freed prisoner to file risky lawsuit

2011-10-19T15:18:00.000-07:00

By DVB
Published: 19 October 2011

Burma's Supreme Court in Rangoon. The independence of the country's judicial system is highly questionable (Reuters)

A human rights activist jailed in 2007 after he was assaulted by a mob alleged to belong to the former junta’s so-called “civic” organisation, the Union Solidarity and Development Association (USDA), says he will file a lawsuit against the perpetrators.

Myint Naing was released from prison last week as part of a controversial amnesty that included some 220 political prisoners. The activist, who worked with the Human Rights Promoters and Defenders (HRDP) network, said that police were also complicit in the attack four years ago in Irrawaddy division, which resulted in he and a colleague being hospitalised.

Following the incident, he was sentenced to eight years in prison on charges of inciting unrest. Now, he says, justice must play its part.

“I was beaten up and also imprisoned – I take this as a violation of my human rights and … I will sue my assailants to bring justice,” said Myint Naing. “I once raised this with the home affairs ministry while I was in prison but they said I could only follow up on this when I’m released.

“Since it is said that there is no one above the law, the first thing I’ll do is to sue them under the constitution.”

Critics of the Burmese regime, including foreign governments and rights groups, say that hundreds of prisoners are locked up on arbitrary, politically-motivated charges. Myint Naing and his colleague had attempted to sue the USDA following the incident, but had been hit by a counter lawsuit.

The independence of the country’s legal system is highly questionable, with few verdicts going in favour of the opposition. While a degree of openness has emerged with the new government, up to 1,700 political prisoners remain behind bars, and critics that that pressure on the government should not ease until they have been released.

Myint Naing says he chose to publicise the lawsuit through media because the newly-formed National Human Rights Commission (NHRC), which includes former government ministers, only has a mandate to deal with new cases, and not existing complaints.

He claims that around 100 people were involved in the attack, which happened on 18 April 2007 in Irrawaddy division’s Henzada township. Police at the scene allegedly used slingshots to provide cover fire for the assailants.

DVB - No let up in Rohingya forced labour

2011-10-19T15:13:00.000-07:00

By FRANCIS WADE
Published: 19 October 2011

Still from video shows Rohingya being forced to work on the Bangladesh-Burma border fence in 2010 (The Arakan Project)

Evidence from surveys carried out among the ethnic Rohingya population of northern Arakan state suggest that contrary to pledges made by the new Burmese government, forced labour has not abated.

Some communities in the impoverished region of western Burma claim that instances of forced labour had in fact risen since the elections in November last, as local authorities push ahead with the completion of infrastructural projects.

The surveys were conducted by The Arakan Project, which has a number of covert fact finding teams working in the area.

“During the period immediately preceding the elections, forced labour demands had noticeably decreased, raising hopes among Rohingyas for a better future under the new government, including some respite from compulsory labour,” the report, ‘Forced labour after the elections’, says.

“Unfortunately, their expectations were short-lived. Within days, forced labour exactions did not simply resume but, by December, reached a peak unseen since the early 1990s due to extensive repair of the [Burma-Bangladesh] border fence.”

Civilians are mainly sought to work on infrastructure aimed at securing the porous border between the two countries, and allowing for better maneuverability of Burmese troops close to the fence.

The eventual by-product of this, the report warns, will be an intensified militarisation of the region, where abuses of the Muslim minority at the hands of the army and local border guard force, known as NaSaKa, are already rampant. Moreover, the orders for civilians to join the workforce are given by a unit within the army known as Garrison Engineers (GE), reinforcing claims that discrimination against the Rohingya, who are denied citizenship in Burma largely on the basis that they are Muslim, is state-sanctioned.

The report says that while enough government funds have been allocated for the labourers working on the fence and surrounding infrastructure, little of it reaches its supposed destination.

“GE subcontract most construction projects to the NaSaKa Sectors, who siphon off the budget earmarked for the manpower and use forced labour instead.”

According to observations made by Arakan Project teams, children make up as much as 40 percent of the forced labour workforce in the region around Maungdaw and Buthidaung townships in the north of the state. Some of these may be as young as 10.

Reports emerged in Bangladeshi press earlier this week claiming that Dhaka had struck a deal with Naypyidaw to return the thousands of Rohingya refugees living in the two official camps of Kutupalong and Nayapara.

Chris Lewa, head of the Arakan Project, however rubbished these claims, and said there was no evidence of any sort of bilateral agreement being struck. Moreover, the prospect of many of these people being forced to return to Burma to face a situation that has apparently not changed since they fled, will trigger alarm.

“The consequences of these Bangladesh statements are often renewed pressure and abuses on the refugees. Fear is already spreading in the refugee camps, and acts as a ‘push-factor’ for camp refugees to flee by boat to Malaysia,” she told DVB.

Up to 300,000 Rohingya have fled Burma for Bangladesh, but Dhaka has allowed only 28,000 to be registered by the UN, leaving hundreds of thousands eking out a precarious existence in unofficial camps and on the fringes of towns. The Rohingya have been described by various groups as one of the world’s most threatened minorities.

Mizzima - Thant Myint-U book tops India bestseller list during Thein Sein’s visit

2011-10-18T09:10:00.000-07:00

Tuesday, 18 October 2011 22:01 Ko Pauk

New Delhi (Mizzima) – During Burmese President Thein Sein’s four-day visit to India last week, the book “Where China Meets India” by Burmese writer Thant Myint-U topped the bestseller list, according to Asian Age newspaper.

Author Thant Myint-U's book tops the Indian bestseller list. The grandson of the late UN Secretary-General U Thant says Burma will reap vast benefits because of it's location between two countries with a total population of around 2,500 million people.

“The book gives a fascinating account of how the India-China rivalry would shape international politics, particularly in Asia, and how Burma is all set to play a significant role in all this,” Raghu Dayal toldThe Statesman newspaper.

The book predicts that Chinese and Indian policies will compete in Burma and speculates that Western sanctions pushed Burma to a closer relationship to China during the past decade, while creating privileged conditions for Chinese business interests.

Both China and India see Burma’s vast raw materials as attractive commodities for their burgeoning populations, while also serving as a gateway to the Bay of Bengal and a conduit between the two countries, which have a total population of around 2,500 million people.

In the book, Thant Myint-U writes that Chinese areas along the Sino-Burmese border are now more modern than Rangoon, the largest city in Burma.

“For Thant Myint-U, much now depends on the West: if the country’s rehabilitation spurs more new investment, it may once again take its rightful place at the centre of Asian trade,” Thailand-based Bangkok Post correspondent Tim Jhonston wrote in theFinancial Times.

Thant Myint-U, a graduate of Harvard and a Cambridge-educated scholar, is the grandson of the late Burmese UN Secretary-General U Thant.

Thant Myint-U wrote, “Myanmar [Burma], sandwiched between China and India, is at its most important political watershed since the establishment of army rule in 1962,” in an article in the Indian Express newspaper prior to President Thein Sein’s recent visit. He also praised the Burmese president, saying “The new president, himself a former general, surprised everyone.”

In the article, “Open Up to Burma”, he wrote, “Aung San Suu Kyi told me that she believed the president was genuine in wanting change and that she hoped we were at the beginning of a new era in Myanmar's politics.” He met with Suu Kyi in September in Rangoon.

In the article, he said, “The isolated country's transition to democracy is at a crucial stage,” and he suggested three ways to help Burma.

“First is to unambiguously voice support for the reforms under way, while at the same time being patient and refraining from demanding too much too fast. The alternative to what is happening is not a perfect revolution; the alternative is going back to square one.”

Secondly, he said that the Burmese government needed technical advice and the US should lift its sanction against Burma, including trade embargoes.

His previous book, “The River of Lost Footsteps,” raised criticism in some circles, because it suggested that gradual change is inevitable as the country attempts to end its isolation, to promote trade, develop civil society and adopt systematic structural reforms in the government. His new book, “Where China Meets India,” was released in August.

DVB - India flexes diplomatic, military muscle

2011-10-18T09:03:00.000-07:00

By JOSEPH ALLCHIN
Published: 18 October 2011

Indian-made Brahmos missiles have reportedly been deployed to the border with China (Reuters)

India has made serious moves to upgrade its strategic and economic positions in Burma and in the troubled tri-border area between Burma, India and China following President Thein Sein’s visit to the world’s largest democracy.

While the most public declarations to come out of the meeting surrounded the extension of $US500 million worth of credit to Burma from the Indians, Thein Sein also made deals with New Delhi on agricultural cooperation, taking the opportunity to pose next to a tractor.

Not all is calm in that relationship, however. Both sides have alleged one another of doing little to clear their territory of respective anti-government groups, with the Burmese going so far as to accuse the Indians of aiding the rebel Kachin Independence Army (KIA), whom Naypyidaw is currently fighting.

Moreover, alarm at recent reports that India is to deploy Brahmos cruise missiles to Arunachal Pradesh will do little to quell wider regional tensions. The far northestern state is claimed by China, and shares a border with Burma’s northern Kachin state where Indian rebels are believed to be sheltering.

The alleged deployment of missiles is, according to regional expert Bertil Lintner, part of a broader Indian arming of the area, with the addition of landing strips and radar. The Bhramos’ 290 kilometre range would put the Indian’s within striking distance of Lhasa in Tibet, where the Chinese are said to have a considerable arsenal.

Landing capabilities would enable the swifter mobilisation of troops to the troubled northeastern region, while better signal capabilities would improve surveillance in the remote region. This was part of what the Indian Express newspaper heralded as one of the largest single increases in Indian military spending, and would be the first missile battalion on the China border. An additional 89,000 troops would also be deployed because of “urgency showed by the army,” said the Express.

The issue of Indian rebels taking shelter in Burma was inevitably on the agenda, with more evidence that India is supplying artillery to the Burmese military in order to fight groups like United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA) who are sheltering along the Kachin border.

Lintner says he was specifically told that this sale of weapons to Burma had taken place by Indian army personnel. Following Thein Sein’s visit, the Hindustan Times reported that India had “kept options open to supply arms and gunboats” to the Burmese.

This adds to plans by the Indians to hold more regular meetings with their Burmese counterparts. While the Burmese have been more than happy tobalance out their dependence on China as a foreign patron, commentators have questioned the government’s commitment to fighting Indian insurgents, with Lintner describing alleged recent Burmese offensives against these rebels as “phantom operations.”

Perhaps in a retaliatory gesture aimed at fending off Indian accusations of Burmese inaction over rebel groups, the Burmese allegedly accused the Indians of supplying the KIA with food drops from helicopters. James Lung Dao, of the KIA’s political wing, the Kachin Independence Organisation, said he could not “verify” the reports but added that the group had no diplomatic ties with India and had no affiliations to any other armed groups.

As a result, the Burmese allegedly asked for satellite imagery of the bases within its border during Thein Sein’s trip. Both the ULFA and the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) from Manipur are believed to have a presence in Burma, with the latter furthermore rumoured to have been trained by the Chinese in Lhasa. The PLA are on their part are alleged to have trained Indian Maoist rebels in Burma.

Both outfits were mentioned in a similar leaked Indian memo that claimed they have been visited by Chinese and Pakistani agents.

Sensational releases such as this were viewed with suspicion, given their timing just prior to Thein Sein’s visit. Some observers saw the leaks as an attempt to put pressure on the Burmese president.

India for its part has also been trying to mimic China’s tactic of establishing strategic presences in key countries ringing their adversary. This has specifically included Vietnam who posses their own grievances and fears regarding China, particularly over disputed maritime boundaries in the South China Sea. The growing relationship between India and Vietnam will likely include joint navy patrols and potentially the transfer of Bhramos missiles to Vietnam. India has further been working on relations with Indonesia and Mongolia, both key nations surrounding China.

The tri-border region sees Burma in a strategic position, although questions are asked of its inability to fully appease either of its giant neighbours.

DVB - Zarganar cautions against ‘Burma Spring’

2011-10-18T08:57:00.000-07:00

By NAY THWIN
Published: 18 October 2011

Libyan rebel fighters celebrate as they drive through Tripoli's Qarqarsh district on 22 August. Burmese comedian Zarganar says that an uprising in Burma would unlikely bear fruit (Reuters)

Now is not the time for Burmese to take to the streets and attempt to bring down the government, popular comedian Zarganar has warned.
Despite spending the past three years in a cell in Myitkyina prison in northernBurma, the 50-year-old says he was able to keep up to date with local and global developments.
“I read about the Arab Spring and the changes caused by it, and that Gaddafi has not been caught yet,” he told DVB, referring to the popular protests that have brought down several governments in northern Africa and the Middle East. His comments echo ones made earlier in the year by Aung San Suu Kyi, who said an uprising was not the solution for Burma
“I don’t know what will happen in next two years [in Burma] but for the time being, I don’t think we need something like it. In my opinion, this is not the time to be protesting in the streets.”
Following months of protests in the Arab world, rumours emerged that the Burmese leadership had begun to fear a similar turn of events on the streets of Rangoon and elsewhere, although this never materialised.
Instead they have enacted a slew of reforms intended to appease critics and signal that the political landscape is finally progressing.
Zarganar, a long-time opponent of the government, who was initially handed a 35-year sentence for criticising its woeful response to Cyclone Nargis in 2008 before being freed last week, has wasted no time in rounding on Naypyidaw’s so-called reformists. He claims the prisoner amnesty last week was largely superficial, given that some 1,700 dissidents remain behind bars.
Although Zarganar has set he will return to work soon, and evidently has little fear about criticising the government, his looming tour of the country, during which he will visit political prisoners, means that his career will be put on hold for the time being.

Bouts of illness worry Min Ko Naing’s family

2011-10-17T11:52:00.000-07:00

DVB

By NAW NOREEN
Published: 17 October 2011

Min Ko Naing was sentenced in November 2008 to 65 years in prison (Reuters)

The sister of jailed student leader Min Ko Naing says that the influential activist has been on medication for more than two months in his cell in Lashio prison but remains upbeat.

In an interview following a visit to the prison in Shan state last week, Kyi Kyi Nyunt said that her brother had been suffering from hypertension and a heart complaint, and is taking drugs to settle the bouts of dizziness that accompany the condition.

“He has medical staff on standby in the prison and they actually care for him. He also gets access for outside specialists at times.”

The prominent student leader, who played a pivotal role in organising both the 1988 and 2007 uprisings in Burma, was initially rumoured to be on the list of political prisoners to be released in an amnesty last week. That was however quickly dispelled by his sister.

“Regarding the amnesty, he said that although he was not included, he’s happy for those who were released and their families all the same,” Kyi Kyi Nyunt said.

On the signs of a thaw in relations between the new government and the opposition, Min Ko Naing was somewhat sceptical.

“He said he welcomed Daw Aung San Suu Kyi having discussions with the [government] as it shows that we’re on a path to dialogue, something that he and everyone has been calling for. But he said that in his opinion, there should be a precise time-frame for it and that he will accept [Suu Kyi’s] decision from the discussions.”

Min Ko Naing belongs to the more hardline faction of Burma’s pro-democracy movement, making it unlikely that he will be released anytime soon. The 48-year-old was sentenced to 65 years in jail in November 2008, having been released from a 15-year term only four years earlier.

Kyi Kyi Nyunt was cautious not to speculate on her brother’s feelings, particularly regarding the possibility of Suu Kyi becoming a member of parliament.

“He said he very much worried that people might misunderstand him because I used the wrong vocabulary. He said the thing he worried about the most in over 20 years of detention was that his reputation would be damaged due to wrong interpretations of words.”

Zarganar to embark on prison tour

2011-10-17T11:45:00.000-07:00

DVB
By SHWE AUNG
Published: 17 October 2011

Comedian, actor and political prisoner Zaganar, who was released from Myitkyina prison in northern Burma, smiles at Rangoon domestic airport (Reuters)

Renowned Burmese comedian Zarganar who was released from jail last week says he will soon set off on a trip around the country to visit the nearly 1,700 political prisoners not included in the controversial amnesty.

Speaking to DVB late last week, the popular performer said that he had numbers of items donated by sympathisers to take to the various prisons he will visit.

Zarganar was released early from a 35-year sentence on 12 October, but was quick to criticise what he billed as window-dressing by the Thein Sein administration, whom observers had hoped would include a significant number of political prisoners in the amnesty, rather than the estimated 220 released.

“I will bring these donated items along and visit prisoners in places like Lashio and Taunggyi – although I cannot meet with [the political inmates] in the prison, I could send in parcels as moral support,” he said.

“We want them to know that we always have their back. I also worry that they will feel down [having been left out of the amnesty].”

Zarganar’s criticism of the release was echoed by a number of rights groups. Amnesty International labelled it as “disappointing”, while Human Rights Watch warned that the country remained a far from secure environment for regime critics.

Joining Zarganar, who will set off tomorrow, will be a number of other well-known faces from the entertainment world, including actor Min Maw Kun and musician Sai Sai Kham Hlaing.

Although Zarganar has set he will return to work soon, and evidently has little fear about criticising the government, the looming prison visits means that his career will be put on hold for the time being.

India offers Burma $500 million credit line for infrastructure projects, inks oil exploration pact

2011-10-16T14:13:00.000-07:00

Leaders target doubling bilateral trade to $3 billion

Jason OverdorfOctober 14, 2011 07:48

Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh (R) shakes hands with Myanmar President U Thein Sein after a signing of agreements at Hyderabad House in New Delhi on October 14, 2011. India rolled out the red carpet for Myanmar President Thein Sein, on a visit that followed his government's release of 200 political detainees -- the latest in a series of reformist moves. (AFP/Getty Images)

India and Burma agreed Friday to expand cooperation in oil and gas exploration, open up border trade and speed up the construction of natural gas pipelines, the Associated Press reported.

Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh offered visiting Burmese President Thein Sein $500 million in credits for infrastructure projects, including roads, inland waterways and ports, the news agency said.

The move marks a significant step forward -- though perhaps not a giant leap -- for India's Look East policy, which is designed to increase India's ties and influence in Southeast Asia and Asia-Pacific, as GlobalPost reported Wednesday. Seen by many as an effort to counter's China's rising influence and increasing activity in India's own backyard, India's past attempts to become an actor in these areas has sometimes been met with bellicose rhetoric from Beijing.

But Indian officials downplayed any competition with Beijing in furthering ties with Burma, the AP said.

Singh and Thein emphasized in a joint statement the need for energy security, and Burma agreed to encourage more Indian investments in its energy sector, the agency reported.

The two leaders also targeted doubling bilateral trade to $3 billion from last year's $1.28 billion by 2015.

Trade between India and Myanmar totaled $1.28 billion last year. The two countries have set a modest target of $3 billion by 2015.

But bolder moves could be on the way.

In an editorial in the Indian Express earlier Friday, foreign policy expert C. Raja Mohan, of India's Center for Policy Research, suggested that India can take a pivotal role in Burma's moves toward real democratic reforms, as its sole democratic ally.

He suggested that India should push western nations to remove economic sanctions against Burma -- which formed a nominally democratic government last year, though the elections were a single-party sham, in what some see as a litmus test for real polls down the road. Mohan also said India should "contribute to internal peace-building [and] assist in the democratic transition" in Burma, though he offered no prescription for what tactics New Delhi might employ to those ends.

http://www.globalpost.com/dispatches/globalpost-blogs/the-rice-bowl/india-offers-burma-500-million-credit-line-infrastructure-

Original source -

Bangkok Post - Burma's hopes ride on ethnic reconciliation

2011-10-15T14:21:00.000-07:00

Image via Wikipedia

Published: 16/10/2011 at 12:00 AM
Newspaper section: News

Considering the 'Balkanised'makeup of Burma and the prevalence of armed militias, coupled with the long history of bad blood, it seems extremely unlikely that reconciliation will come about without an international presenceWhile it is still too early to know if the moves by the Burmese government toward democratisation and social justice signal a permanent shift in policy, clearly there is reason to be optimistic. Burma staged its first general election in 20 years on Nov 7, bringing to power a pro-military but ostensibly civilian government led by ex-general President Thein Sein. Democracy leader Aung San Suu Kyi was released from house arrest a week later. She has since met President Thein Sein to discuss reconciliation measures and had positive things to say about the meeting. Last week, Burma released 6,359 prisoners, including 220 political prisoners. There is much justified criticism that nearly 2,000 political prisoners remain incarcerated. Yet these developments are an indication that the new government realises the futility of trying to cling to power in isolation from the rest of the world. However, no one can doubt that the real work lies ahead.

One of the biggest, perhaps the biggest, obstacles to reconciliation is that the populace of the country is so diverse. While the repression under various military dictatorships in past decades can never be excused, it must be admitted that the task of integrating so many different ethnic groups under one national identity isn't easy. There are altogether more than 130 minorities in the country and eight major ethnic groups, most of which maintain armed militias either under ceasefire agreements with the government or engaged in active hostilities.

In the past and continuing into the present, the Burmese army has selectively targetted certain ethnic groups with systematic human rights violations that include including forced labour, rape, torture, extra-judicial killings and forced relocations. Until this is stopped it cannot be said that Burma is ready to rejoin the international community.

At the same time, the hopeful signs coming out of Naypyidaw should not be dismissed or derided. It is a difficult situation for the international community, one that can only really be improved by positive steps for ethnic groups in the area of human rights. President Thein Sein made a public offer of peace to the armed ethnic minority resistance groups, inviting them to join in Border Guard Force under the control of the Burmese army, but most of the groups have eyed this proposal with suspicion.

Aung Lynn Htut is a former Burmese counter-intelligence officer who sought political asylum in Washington in 2005. In an opinion piece for the Irrawaddy online magazine he argues for equal treatment for all ethnic armed groups, and says the new government is following the policy of the old regime in clashing with ethnic armed groups in Kachin, Karen and Shan states, while at the same time conducting negotiations with two armed groups which have influence inside China, the Wa and Akha militias.

Even with the best of intentions it is doubtful the government could bring about peace and reconciliation with all the various groups. Unfortunately there is no real reason to assume that these are the government's intentions, but regardless, it may be possible to establish United Nations-brokered peace negotiations. Considering the ''Balkanised'' makeup of Burma and the prevalence of armed ethnic militias, coupled with the long history of bad blood, it seems extremely unlikely that reconciliation will come about without an international presence.

Realistically it seems a long shot that the government would agree to any such arrangement, but clearly the UN and the international community do have leverage inside the country. For one, it is obvious that the government desires the removal of sanctions placed on Burma by the West. Just as important is the threat of international prosecution of Burmese government figures past and present. In a report to the UN's Human Rights Commission (HRC) in early 2010, Tomas Quintana, UN Special Rapporteur on Human Rights to Burma, called for convening an international court of inquiry to look into possible crimes against humanity and war crimes in Burma. Neither the HRC nor the UN Security Council have acted on the recommendation, but there is a great deal of evidence compiled by human rights groups that might be brought forth in such an inquiry. If the new government were made to understand that this would be a likely development if they don't show their commitment to democratisation in general and reconciliation with ethnic minorities in particular, it might yield the desired results.

ICG - Myanmar: Major Reform Underway

2011-09-26T08:48:00.001-07:00

Jakarta/Brussels | 22 Sep 2011

Six months after the transition to a new, semi-civilian government, major changes are taking place in Myanmar, but many steps still need to be taken to overcome decades of conflict.

Myanmar: Major Reform Underway , the latest briefing from the International Crisis Group, examines how President Thein Sein has moved rapidly to begin implementing an ambitious reform agenda first set out in his March 2011 inaugural address. Since mid-July there has been a dramatic change of approach as he has reached out to long-time critics of the former regime, proposing that differences be put aside in order to work together for the good of the country. National League of Democracy leader Aung San Suu Kyi has seized the opportunity, meeting the new leader in Naypyitaw and emerging with the conviction that he wants to achieve positive change.

“In recent weeks a series of concrete steps have been taken to begin implementing the president’s reform agenda, aimed at reinvigorating the economy, reforming national politics and improving human rights”, says Jim Della-Giacoma, Crisis Group’s South East Asia Project Director. “While there are strong indications that the political will exists to bring fundamental change, success will require much more than a determined leader, as resistance can be expected from hardliners in the power structure and spoilers with a vested interest in the status quo”.

President Thein Sein’s inauguration followed 50 years of authoritarian military rule . His new administration, which assumed responsibility for a country still split by deep ethnic division and violent conflict, took some months to gain momentum but now seems to be setting a completely different tone for governance, allowing discussions and initiatives that were unthinkable only a few months ago.

There are already indications that key benchmarks many in the West have insisted on may soon be reached, as major initiatives, such as the release of political prisoners, are now under consideration. Internal progress on human rights and economic reforms that benefit the country’s citizens should be acknowledged and supported by the international community. Crisis Group has long held the view that sanctions on Myanmar – targeted and non-targeted – are counterproductive, encouraging a siege mentality among its leadership and harming its mostly poor population. The greater the pace of change, the weaker the rationale becomes for continuing them – or adding more.

“With the political process moving ahead quickly, now is not the time for the West to remain disengaged and sceptical”, says Robert Templer, Crisis Group’s Asia Program Director. “It is critical to grasp this unique opportunity to support a process that not even the most optimistic observers saw coming. This requires a new, pro-active and engaged approach, in line with the positive signals coming from Naypyitaw”.

To listen to Jim Della-Giacoma, Crisis Group’s South East Asia Project Director, talkabout changes on the ground in Myanmar please click here for the podcast.

Identity, Image and Ethnic Conflict in Burma: A Case Study of Mon People

2011-09-11T11:01:00.000-07:00

Date: 2010

Keywords:

Burma, Conflict, Identity, Image, Mon, Resolution

Abstract:

Burma's ethnic conflict is one of the longest conflicts in the world. The conflict has been ongoing since 1948. The conflict has resulted in the loss of thousands of lives and thousands more have become refugees or internally displaced persons. This study attempts to explain the root causes of ethnic conflict in Burma through an in-depth analysis of the Mon ethnic group as a case study. Based on the results of the analysis, the study presents possible solutions to the conflict. The results show that the conflict is caused by three major factors: threats to ethnic identity, nationalist sentiments, and images of out-group. When the Mon ethnic identity was identified and measured, the Mons are highly nationalistic and strongly identified with their group. Thus, they are prompted to respond to threats to their identity. Major factors explaining the threats to Mon ethnic identity are the loss of territory, downgrading of identity, restrictions on the teaching of language and literature, and practicing of culture, the destruction of national symbols, internal migrations and population transfer, intermarriage, and threats of annihilation. The Mon have a barbarian image of the Burman because they see Burman as superior in capability, inferior in status, and as having harmful intentions. The level of in-group identity also has a positive correlation with the level of barbarian image. These two variables (identity and barbarian image) also have positive correlations with the level of conflict. This implies that those who have higher levels of in-group identity and a greater barbarian image of the Burman results in higher levels of conflict. The level of barbarian image also shows a positive correlation with the forming of alliances with other non-Burman ethnic groups and fighting against the Burman. The current Burmese government's "seven steps road map" will not provide a solution to the ethnic conflict in Burma. Burma's ethnic problems could be solved by dialogue among all stakeholders, democratization, power-sharing, and the forming of a super-ordinate identity. These can happen through the establishment of a genuine federal political system that guarantees autonomy to all ethnic groups in Burma.

Show full item record

Files in this item

Name:Mon_wsu_0251E_100 ...

Size:2.072Mb

Format:PDF

View/Open

Burma Monitor

New book praises Suu Kyi’s nonviolence

Burma Must End Discrimination: ENC

EWC - BEYOND ARMED RESISTANCE: ETHNONATIONAL POLITICS IN BURMA (MYANMAR)

BEYOND ARMED RESISTANCE: ETHNONATIONAL POLITICS IN BURMA (MYANMAR)

by Ardeth Maung Thawnghmung

Policy Studies, No. 62

Bangkok Post - Jade or jaded? The sanctions on Burmese gems

ISEAS Bookshop - In the Name of Pauk-Phaw: Myanmar's China Policy Since 1948

TBBC - Displacement and Poverty in South East Burma

Washington Post - Answering Burma

By Editorial, Published: October 23

WSJ - Suu Kyi Notes Progress in Myanmar, Urges More Change

By WSJ Staff Reporters

Political Repression in Myanmar

Shan Herald - Harn Yawnghwe denies political motivations for trip to Burma

Myanmar Times, Vol. 597

Mizzima - ‘In solitary: I wanted to talk with people: that was the biggest desire’

DVB - Espen Barth Eide: ‘Norway is optimistic’

Andrew Seith - Burma's Muslims and the War on Terror (2004)

Chinland Guardian - Chin Pastors Delivered Aid to Kachin Refugees

Rohingya Blogger - Letter from America: Muslim Identity and Demography in Arakan

RFA - Will Suu Kyi Accept Government Post?

2011-10-23

Mizzima - Is a Burmese anti-war movement possible?

Mizzima - Exile voices in demand among domestic journals

Derek Tonkin - Burmese Mythology

Rohingya Blogger - The Arab Spring and Myanmar

RFA - ASEAN Urged To Delay Decision

2011-10-19

DVB - Arrests highlight Burma-China gun trade

DVB - Burma to drop ban on satellite TV

Irrawaddy - Indonesian MPs Give Burma Reform Lessons

Mizzima - ‘The doctrine a person embraces is important’ – Min Ko Naing

DVB - Malaysia and Burma plan migrant swap

DVB - Freed prisoner to file risky lawsuit

DVB - No let up in Rohingya forced labour

Mizzima - Thant Myint-U book tops India bestseller list during Thein Sein’s visit

DVB - India flexes diplomatic, military muscle

DVB - Zarganar cautions against ‘Burma Spring’

Bouts of illness worry Min Ko Naing’s family

Zarganar to embark on prison tour

India offers Burma $500 million credit line for infrastructure projects, inks oil exploration pact

Bangkok Post - Burma's hopes ride on ethnic reconciliation

ICG - Myanmar: Major Reform Underway

Jakarta/Brussels | 22 Sep 2011

Identity, Image and Ethnic Conflict in Burma: A Case Study of Mon People

Keywords:

Abstract:

Files in this item

by
Ardeth Maung Thawnghmung